

Verification of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks: An Algebraic Approach

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Abstract

We introduced Computed Network Process Theory to reason about protocols for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). Here we explore the applicability of our framework in two regards: model checking and equational reasoning. The operational semantics of our framework is based on constrained labeled transition systems (*CLTSs*), in which each transition label is parameterized with the set of topologies for which this transition is enabled. We illustrate how through model checking on *CLTSs* one can analyse mobility scenarios of MANET protocols. Furthermore, we show how by equational theory one can reason about MANETs consisting of a finite but unbounded set of nodes, in which all nodes deploy the same protocol. Model checking and equational reasoning together provide us with an appropriate framework to prove the correctness of MANETs. We demonstrate the applicability of our framework by a case study on a simple routing protocol.

Keywords: Process theory, local broadcast, mobility, axiomatization, uniform MANET, symbolic verification

1. Introduction

Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) consist of mobile nodes equipped with wireless transceivers to communicate with each other directly or along multihop paths. Two nodes can effectively communicate if they are located in the communication range of each other, defined by the underlying topology.

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Wireless communication is inherently unreliable; a node may not succeed to communicate due to noise in the environment. Moreover, mobility of nodes makes the underlying topology dynamic. The characteristics of wireless communication and dynamism of the underlying topology require a suitable framework for the modeling and verification of MANETs.

We introduced *Restricted Broadcast Process Theory (RBPT)* in [1] to specify and verify MANET protocols, taking into account mobility of nodes. Topology changes are modeled implicitly in the semantics, and thus one can verify a network with respect to arbitrary topology changes. *Computed Network Process Theory (CNT)* [2, 3] is an extension of *RBPT* with so-called computed network terms and auxiliary operators, as an expedient verification framework with a sound and complete axiom system, modulo so-called rooted branching computed network bisimilarity. The operational semantics of *CNT* is given by constrained labeled transition systems (*CLTSs*), in which each transition label is parameterized by a set of topologies for which this transition is enabled.

In this paper, we enhance and illustrate the applicability of our framework for the verification of MANETs in two regards: model checking and equational reasoning. We show how the semantic model of *CLTSs* makes it possible to derive and analyse mobility scenarios for MANET protocols. We exploit the mCRL2 toolset [4] to convert *CNT* specifications into *CLTSs*, and then the CADP toolset [5] to verify properties.

To verify MANET protocols for large networks, or if one needs to deal with infinite data domains, model checking is not readily applicable. Since MANETs often consist of an arbitrary set of nodes that run the same protocols, we develop a symbolic verification technique for such networks within the *CNT* framework, based on the cones and foci method [6, 7, 8]. This technique works on a restricted class of specifications, called linear computed network equations, in which the states are data objects, and rephrases the question whether the system specification and implementation are equivalent in terms of proof obligations on relations between data objects. We exploit our equations to convert the parallel composition of an arbitrary number of similar processes, modulo some data parameters, to a single linear equation using the Composition Theorem from [9]. The Composition Theorem however is based on the assumption that communications are restricted to two processes. Since in our framework wireless communication is an essential ingredient, we generalize the Composition Theorem to this setting. The linear equation representing the MANET of similar nodes, and the desired external

behavior of this network (also expressed by a linear equation) are taken as input to the symbolic verification technique, which reduces the question of their behavioral equivalence to proving data equalities. The framework of mCRL2 [10] allows for this tight integration between processes and data.

To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to address the symbolic verification of MANETs. We use a simple routing protocol based on ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) routing protocol as a running example, and prove that the protocol correctly routes data from a source to a destination.

The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the modeling concepts and operational semantics underlying *CNT*. Section 3 explains the formal framework: syntax and axioms. Section 4 presents a case study, and shows how our semantic model is capable of deriving errors caused by the mobility of nodes. In Section 5 we explain our symbolic verification approach, and how it can be exploited to verify MANETs with similar nodes. Finally, Section 6 summarizes our results and future work.

2. Concepts

In wireless communication, when a node transmits a message, only nodes that are located in its transmission area can receive this message. For this reason, the communication in wireless networks is called local broadcast. We model the unreliable local broadcast service provided by the MAC-layer (of each MANET node), in which the sender and receiver are synchronous and receive actions carry (error-free) messages. A node B is *connected to* a node A , if B is located within the transmission range of A . This connectivity relation between nodes, which is not necessarily symmetric, introduces a *topology* concept. A topology is a function $\gamma : Loc \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(Loc)$ where $A, B, C \in Loc$ denote a finite set of addresses, which models the hardware addresses. The network topology, due to the mobility of nodes in a MANET, is dynamic and may change rapidly and unpredictably over time.

We model mobility implicitly in the semantics; each state is representative of all possible topologies a network can meet, and a network can be at any of these topologies. Each transition is constrained by a set of topologies for which such a behavior is possible. We introduced *network constraints* in [2] to formally specify the set of topologies. The set of addresses is extended with the unknown address $?$. A network constraint \mathcal{C} is a set of connectivity pairs $\rightsquigarrow: Loc \times Loc$, such that the second address cannot be $?$. The connectivity

pair $? \rightsquigarrow A$ denotes that a node with address A is connected to an unknown address from which it can receive data, while $B \rightsquigarrow A$ denotes that A is connected to B and consequently B can send data to A . We write $\{B \rightsquigarrow A, C\}$ instead of $\{B \rightsquigarrow A, B \rightsquigarrow C\}$. Each network constraint \mathcal{C} represents the set of topologies that satisfy the connectivity pairs in \mathcal{C} , i.e., $\{\gamma | \forall \ell \in Loc \cdot \mathcal{C}(\ell) \subseteq \gamma(\ell)\}$. Therefore, the empty network constraint $\{\}$ denotes all possible topologies. Let \mathbb{C} denote the set of all network constraints that can be defined over network addresses in Loc .

In this paper, compared to [3], we transfer network constraints from transition subscripts into transition labels, which are interpreted as the set of topologies for which such a transition is enabled. This transmission of network constraints from the transitions into the labels simplifies our framework, as will be explained in Section 3.2. We override the definition of *constrained labeled transition systems* (CLTSs), the operational behavior of MANETs, given in [3] such that the previous results are preserved.

Let Msg denote a set of messages communicated over a network and ranged over by \mathbf{m} . Let Act be the network send and receive actions with signatures $nsnd : Msg \times Loc$ and $nrcv : Msg$ respectively. The send action $nsnd(\mathbf{m}, \ell)$ denotes that the message \mathbf{m} is transmitted from a node with the address ℓ , while the receive action $nrcv(\mathbf{m})$ denotes that the message \mathbf{m} is ready to be received. Let $Act_\tau = Act \cup \{\tau\}$, ranged over by η .

Definition 1. A CLTS is defined by $\langle S, L, \rightarrow, s_0 \rangle$, with S a set of states, $L \subseteq \mathbb{C} \times Act_\tau$, $\rightarrow \subseteq S \times L \times S$ a transition relation, and $s_0 \in s$ the initial state. A transition $(s, (\mathcal{C}, \eta), s') \in \rightarrow$ is denoted by $s \xrightarrow{(\mathcal{C}, \eta)} s'$.




Figure 1: A part of the behavioral model of a MANET.

Suppose for a real MANET (a network with a set of nodes, each running a process), its behavior is modeled by a CLTS partly shown in Figure 1. Consider the behavior of the real MANET when all processes of nodes are

reset. We explain how the behavior of this MANET for the scenario depicted in Figure 2 can be inferred from its *CLTS* model. Initially its *CLTS* is in state s_0 irrespective of the underlying topology. When the underlying topology changes from 2.1 to 2.2 in the MANET, the state of its *CLTS* is not changed, since each state is representative of any topology changes. When the underlying topology is 2.2, the message \mathbf{m}_1 is sent by node A . Since the underlying topology belongs to the network constraints $\{\}$ and $\{A \rightsquigarrow B\}$, the *CLTS* implies that the behavior of MANET would become state s_0 or s_1 . Being in any of these states, when the underlying topology of MANET changes to 2.3 and then 2.4, the state of its model is not changed. However, when the underlying topology is 2.4, node B sends \mathbf{m}_2 . Since a transition with such an action does not belong to state s_0 , it can be inferred that the previous behavior of MANET was s_1 . The model explains that since the underlying topology belongs to the network constraints $\{\}$ and $\{B \rightsquigarrow A\}$, the next behavior of the MANET would be either s_0 or s_2 .




Figure 2: A mobility scenario.

For the executions of the *CLTS* in Figure 1, such as $s_0 \xrightarrow{(\{A \rightsquigarrow B\}, nsnd(\mathbf{m}_1, A))} s_1 \xrightarrow{(\{B \rightsquigarrow A\}, nsnd(\mathbf{m}_2, B))} s_2$, we can derive different mobility scenarios for the real MANET, as shown in Figure 3.

Concluding, a *CLTS* defines the behavior of the corresponding MANET for arbitrary topology changes, and an execution of the *CLTS* represents multiple mobility scenarios.

3. Formal Framework: Computed Network Theory

To separate the manipulation of data from processes, we make use of equational abstract data types [11]. Data is specified by equational specifications: one can declare data types (so-called *sorts*) and functions working upon these data types, and describe the meaning of these functions by equational axioms. Following the approach of [12, 13], we consider Computed




Figure 3: Two mobility scenarios for an execution fragment of the *CLTS* in Figure 1.

Network Theory with equational abstract data types. We first explain the set of data types considered in our framework, and then define the *CNT* operators and their axioms.

3.1. Data Types

We treat the set of network addresses *Loc*, messages *Msg* and network constraints \mathbb{C} as data types within the *CNT* framework. By defining appropriate functions over them, we can provide the axioms and operational semantics of computed network terms. We use mCRL2 notation to define data types: *sort* declares sort names, *func* specifies constructor and *map* non-constructor functions, *var* declares variable names, and *rew* defines non-constructor functions by means of rewrite rules. We assume that the function $if : Bool \times D \times D$ is defined for all data sorts *D*, which returns the first *D* parameter if the boolean parameter equals true, otherwise the second *D* parameter is returned.

The data sort *Bool* is used in the conditional operator construct to change the behavior of a process in terms of data values. This data sort is defined by two constructors *T* and *F*. The conventional operators \wedge , \vee and \neg can be defined over it straightforwardly. The data sort *Nat* specifies the natural numbers by the constant 0 and the unary function *succ*. We use $1, 2, \dots$ for $succ(0), succ(succ(0)), \dots$. The definition of functions $+$, $>$, \geq and *eq* are straightforward.

Some data sort definitions are given in Figure 4. For a complete definition see [14]. The network addresses are generated from the constant $?$ and the unary function *adr*. We use A, B, \dots to denote $adr(?), adr(adr(?)), \dots$

<pre> <i>sort</i> <i>Msg</i> <i>func</i> <i>req</i> : <i>Loc</i> → <i>Msg</i> <i>rep</i> : <i>Loc</i> × <i>Loc</i> → <i>Msg</i> <i>map</i> <i>isType_{req}</i> : <i>Msg</i> → <i>Bool</i> <i>eq</i> : <i>Msg</i> × <i>Msg</i> → <i>Bool</i> <i>var</i> <i>l, l₁, l₂, l₃, l₄</i> : <i>Loc</i> <i>rew</i> <i>eq</i>(<i>req</i>(<i>l₁</i>), <i>req</i>(<i>l₂</i>)) = <i>eq</i>(<i>l₁</i>, <i>l₂</i>) <i>eq</i>(<i>rep</i>(<i>l₁</i>, <i>l₂</i>), <i>rep</i>(<i>l₃</i>, <i>l₄</i>)) = <i>eq</i>(<i>l₁</i>, <i>l₃</i>) ∧ <i>eq</i>(<i>l₂</i>, <i>l₄</i>) <i>isType_{req}</i>(<i>req</i>(<i>l</i>)) = <i>T</i> <i>isType_{req}</i>(<i>rep</i>(<i>l₁</i>, <i>l₂</i>)) = <i>F</i> </pre>	<pre> <i>sort</i> <i>Loc</i> <i>func</i> ? :→ <i>Loc</i> <i>adr</i> : <i>Loc</i> → <i>Loc</i> <i>map</i> <i>eq</i> : <i>Loc</i> × <i>Loc</i> → <i>Bool</i> > : <i>Loc</i> × <i>Loc</i> → <i>Bool</i> <i>sort</i> \mathbb{C} <i>func</i> <i>empNC</i> :→ \mathbb{C} <i>con</i> : <i>Loc</i> × <i>Loc</i> × \mathbb{C} → \mathbb{C} <i>map</i> <i>union</i> : \mathbb{C} × \mathbb{C} → \mathbb{C} <i>subs</i> : <i>Loc</i> × <i>Loc</i> × \mathbb{C} → \mathbb{C} <i>include</i> : \mathbb{C} × \mathbb{C} → <i>Bool</i> </pre>
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Figure 4: Data sorts used in the *CNT* framework.

The functions *eq* and > compare two network addresses. The network constraints are generated from the constant *empNC* and the *con* function which adds a connectivity pair to network constraints. The function *union* merges two network constraints such that the redundant connections are removed and the connectivity pairs are sorted in terms of the connected addresses (i.e. the second parameter in *con*). The function *subs* substitutes all occurrences of the address in its second parameter with the address in its first parameter. The function *include* examines if the connectivity pairs of a network constraint are included in another. We write $\mathcal{C}_1 \cup \mathcal{C}_2$, $\mathcal{C}_1 \subseteq \mathcal{C}_2$ and $\mathcal{C}[\ell/\ell']$ instead of *union*($\mathcal{C}_1, \mathcal{C}_2$), *include*($\mathcal{C}_1, \mathcal{C}_2$) and *subs*(\mathcal{C}, ℓ, ℓ') respectively. We also write $\{\}$, $\{A \rightsquigarrow B\}$, $\{A \rightsquigarrow B, C\}$ for *empNC*, *con*(*A*, *B*, *empNC*), *con*(*A*, *B*, *con*(*A*, *C*, *empNC*)).

A message can carry data parameters. For instance, in Figure 4, the message *req* : *Loc* → *Msg* has one parameter of type *Loc*. The function *eq* compares two messages. For each message name *m* defined in *Msg*, a function *isType_m* : *Mag* → *Bool* is defined which examines if a message term is constructed by the message name *m*.

The semantics of the data part (of a specification), denoted by *ID*, is defined the same way as in [13]. It should contain the *Bool* domain with distinct *T* and *F* constants, *Loc*, \mathbb{C} , and *Msg* domains.

3.2. Computed Network Terms

Let D denote a data sort; u, v and d range over closed and open data terms of sort D , respectively. Data terms are written as follows for the different sorts: b is of type *Bool*, \mathbf{m} is of type *Msg*, ℓ is of type *Loc*, and \mathcal{C} is of type \mathbb{C} . Let $d[d_1/d_2]$ denote substitution of d_2 by d_1 in the data term d ; this can be extended to computed network terms. Let \mathcal{A} denote a countably infinite set of process names which are used as recursion variables in recursive specifications. This set can be split into two disjoint subsets \mathcal{A}_p and \mathcal{A}_n . Without loss of generality we assume that process names and messages have exactly one parameter.

The transmission of network constraints into labels allows to treat the so-called computed network terms, introduced in [3], as prefixed terms, so that the previous two-level syntax of *CNT* collapses to one:

$$t ::= 0 \mid \beta.t \mid t + t \mid [b]t \diamond t \mid \sum_{d:D} t \mid A(d), A(d : D) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} t \mid \llbracket t \rrbracket_\ell \mid t \mid t \mid t \ll t \mid t \parallel t \mid (\nu \ell)t \mid \tau_m(t) \mid \partial_m(t)$$

0 defines a deadlock process. The prefix operator in $\beta.t$ denote a process which performs β and then behaves as t . The action β can be of two types:

- $rcv(\mathbf{m})$ and $snd(\mathbf{m})$ actions, denoted by α , which model protocol receive and send actions respectively. They model the interaction of a protocol with its underlying *MAC* layer;
- $(\mathcal{C}, nrcv(\mathbf{m}))$, $(\mathcal{C}, nsnd(\mathbf{m}, \ell))$ and (\mathcal{C}, τ) actions, denoted by (\mathcal{C}, η) , where the first two actions are called the network receive and send actions respectively. They model the interaction of multiple *MAC* layers in a MANET. An action (\mathcal{C}, η) represents the behavior η for the set of topologies specified by \mathcal{C} .

The process $t_1 + t_2$ behaves non-deterministically as t_1 or t_2 . The conditional construct $[b]t_1 \diamond t_2$ behaves as t_1 when $\mathcal{ID} \models b = T$ and as t_2 when $\mathcal{ID} \models b = F$. The summation $\sum_{d:D} t$, which binds the name d to t , defines a non-deterministic choice among $t[u/d]$ for all closed $u \in D$. A process name is declared by $A(d : D) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} t$, where $A \in \mathcal{A}$, and d is a variable name that may appear free in t , meaning that it is not within the scope of a sum operator in t . Computed network terms are considered modulo α -conversion of bound names. The function fn , which returns the set of free names, is defined over computed network terms as usual. A term is closed if the set

of its free names is empty. The deployment of a process t at a network address $\ell \neq ?$ is specified as $\llbracket t \rrbracket_\ell$, which defines a single-node MANET. The parallel composition $t_1 \parallel t_2$ defines two MANETs that communicate by local broadcast; if there is a connectivity between nodes of t_1 and t_2 they may communicate, otherwise the send/receive actions of t_1 and t_2 are interleaved. *CNT* borrows from the process algebra *ACP* [15] the operators *left merge* (\ll) and *communication merge* ($|$) to axiomatize parallel composition. Hiding $(\nu\ell)t$ conceals the activities of a node with the address ℓ by renaming this address to $?$ in network send/receive actions. For each message type $m : D \rightarrow Msg$, the operators $\tau_m(-)$ and $\partial_m(-)$ are defined; *Abstraction* $\tau_m(t)$ renames network send/receive actions over messages of type m to τ , and *Encapsulation* $\partial_m(t)$ forbids receiving messages of type m and renames them to 0. We use $\tau_{\{m_1, \dots, m_n\}}(t)$ and $\partial_{\{m_1, \dots, m_n\}}(t)$ to denote $\tau_{m_1}(\dots(\tau_{m_n}(t))\dots)$ and $\partial_{m_1}(\dots(\partial_{m_n}(t))\dots)$ respectively. We will use MANET, network and computed network term interchangeably.

A computed network term t should be grammatically well-defined:

- If $t \equiv \llbracket t' \rrbracket_\ell$, then t' has no network prefix action (\mathcal{C}, η) , deployment $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket$, parallel \parallel , left merge \ll , communication merge $|$, hiding $(\nu\ell)$, abstraction τ_m , encapsulation ∂_m , and process name $A(d)$ such that $A \in \mathcal{A}_n$.
- If $t \equiv rcv(m(d)).t'$, then it should be in the context of a summation like $\sum_{d:D}$, where $m : D \rightarrow Msg$.
- If $t \equiv \alpha.t'$, then it should be in the context of a deployment operator.
- If $t \equiv A(d)$ where $A \in \mathcal{A}_p$, then it should be in the context of a deployment operator. Furthermore it should be defined by an equation like $A(d : D) \stackrel{def}{=} t'$ such that t' has no network prefix action (\mathcal{C}, η) , deployment $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket$, parallel \parallel , left merge \ll , communication merge $|$, hiding $(\nu\ell)$, abstraction τ_m , encapsulation ∂_m , and process name $A'(d)$ such that $A' \in \mathcal{A}_n$. Moreover, each occurrences of A should be in the context of an α prefix action in t' .
- If $t \equiv B(d)$ where $B \in \mathcal{A}_n$, then it should not be in the context of a deployment operator. Furthermore it should be defined by an equation like $B(d : D) \stackrel{def}{=} t'$ such that t' is well-defined.

Intuitively a computed network is grammatically well-defined if processes deployed at a network address, called protocols, are defined by protocol ac-

tion prefix, choice, summation, conditional, deadlock operators and process names. From now on we will only consider computer network terms that are well-defined. For example, $\llbracket X(A) \rrbracket_A \parallel \llbracket Y(B) \rrbracket_B$ where $X(adr : Loc) \stackrel{def}{=} snd(req(A)).X(adr)$ and $Y(adr : Loc) \stackrel{def}{=} \sum_{lx:Loc} rcv(req(lx)).snd(rep(adr, lx))$. $Y(adr)$ is a well-defined computed network term. The process name X defines a protocol which sends req messages iteratively, while Y receives a req and then sends a rep message.

3.3. Rooted Branching Computed Network Bisimilarity

Computed network terms are considered modulo rooted branching computed network bisimilarity [3]. To define this equivalence relation, we introduce the following notations:

- \Rightarrow denotes the reflexive and transitive closure of unobservable actions:
 - $t \Rightarrow t$;
 - if $t \xrightarrow{(C,\tau)} t'$ for some arbitrary network constraint C and $t' \Rightarrow t''$, then $t \Rightarrow t''$.
- $t \xrightarrow{\langle(C,\eta)\rangle} t'$ iff $t \xrightarrow{(C,\eta)} t'$ or $t \xrightarrow{(C[\ell/?],\eta[\ell/?])} t'$ and η is of the form $nsnd(\mathbf{m}, ?)$ for some \mathbf{m} .

Intuitively $t \Rightarrow t'$ expresses that after a number of topology changes, t can behave like t' . Furthermore, an action like $(\{? \rightsquigarrow B\}, nsnd(req(?), ?))$ can be matched to an action like $(\{A \rightsquigarrow B\}, nsnd(req(A), A))$, which is its $\langle - \rangle$ counterpart.

Definition 2. A binary relation \mathcal{R} on computed network terms is a branching computed network simulation if $t_1 \mathcal{R} t_2$ and $t_1 \xrightarrow{(C,\eta)} t'_1$ implies that either:

- η is of the form $nrcv(\mathbf{m})$ or τ , and $t'_1 \mathcal{R} t_2$; or
- there are t'_2 and t''_2 such that $t_2 \Rightarrow t''_2 \xrightarrow{\langle(C,\eta)\rangle} t'_2$, where $t_1 \mathcal{R} t''_2$ and $t'_1 \mathcal{R} t'_2$.

\mathcal{R} is a branching computed network bisimulation if \mathcal{R} and \mathcal{R}^{-1} are branching computed network simulations. Two terms t_1 and t_2 are branching computed network bisimilar, denoted by $t_1 \simeq_b t_2$, if $t_1 \mathcal{R} t_2$ for some branching computed network bisimulation relation \mathcal{R} .

Definition 3. Two terms t_1 and t are rooted branching computed network bisimilar, written $t_1 \simeq_{rb} t_2$, if:

- $t_1 \xrightarrow{\langle \mathcal{C}, \eta \rangle} t'_1$ implies there is a t'_2 such that $t_2 \xrightarrow{\langle \langle \mathcal{C}, \eta \rangle \rangle} t'_2$ and $t'_1 \simeq_b t'_2$;
- $t_2 \xrightarrow{\langle \mathcal{C}, \eta \rangle} t'_2$ implies there is an t'_1 such that $t_1 \xrightarrow{\langle \langle \mathcal{C}, \eta \rangle \rangle} t'_1$ and $t'_1 \simeq_b t'_2$.

Rooted branching computed network bisimilarity is an equivalence relation and constitutes a congruence with respect to the *CNT* operators; see [3]. Intuitively two computed network terms are equivalent if they send and receive a same set of messages for a set of topologies. However a receiving action which would not change the sending behavior of a node can be removed. Therefore, an only receiving MANET (after its first action) is equivalent to deadlock. It should be noted that a node like $\llbracket Y(B) \rrbracket_B$ is not equivalent to the sending node $\llbracket Y'(B) \rrbracket_B$ where $Y'(adr : Loc) \stackrel{def}{=} \sum_{lx:Loc} snd(rep(adr, lx)).Y'(adr)$, since the latter sends iff it receives a request message while the former always sends.

3.4. Axioms

We define the behavior of operators through their axioms over closed terms, which are sound with respect to rooted branching computed network bisimilarity. The axioms of choice, conditional and summation operator are given in Table 1. The axioms Ch_{1-4} , Con_{1-2} and Sum_{1-4} are straightforward (cf. [16]). The axiom Ch_5 is new in our framework, denoting that a network send action originated from a node of which the address is unknown can be removed if there is a same action originating from a node with a known address. The axiom Ch_6 explains that if an action η is possible for a set of topologies, then it is also possible for all subsets of this set.

Axioms for process names are given in Table 2. *Unfold* and *Fold* express existence and uniqueness of a solution for the equation $A(d : D) \stackrel{def}{=} t$, which correspond to the *Recursive Definition Principle (RDP)* and *Recursive Specification Principle (RSP)* in *ACP*. An occurrence of a process name A in t is called *guarded* if this occurrence is in the scope of an action prefix operator (not (\mathcal{C}, τ) prefix) and not in the scope of an abstraction operator [3]. A is *guarded* in t if every occurrence of A in t is guarded.

Axioms for deployment, left and communication merge, and parallel operators are given in Table 3. The axioms Dep_{3-5} , Br , LM_{1-4} and $S_{1-3,5}$ are straightforward. Dep_1 expresses that when a protocol sends a message

Table 1: Axioms for choice, conditional and summation operators.

Ch_1	$0 + t = t$	Sum_1	$\sum_{d:D} t = t, d \notin fn(t)$
Ch_2	$t_1 + t_2 = t_2 + t_1$	Sum_2	$\sum_{d:D} t = \sum_{e:D} t[e/d]$
Ch_3	$t_1 + (t_2 + t_3) = (t_1 + t_2) + t_3$	Sum_3	$\sum_{d:D} t = \sum_{d:D} t + t[u/d]$
Ch_4	$t + t = t$	Sum_4	$\sum_{d:D} (t_1 + t_2) = \sum_{d:D} t_1 + \sum_{d:D} t_2$
Con_1	$[b]t_1 \diamond t_2 = t_1, \mathbb{ID} \models b = T$	Con_2	$[b]t_1 \diamond t_2 = t_2, \mathbb{ID} \models b = F$
Ch_5	$(\mathcal{C}, nsnd(\mathbf{m}, ?)).t + \langle (\mathcal{C}, nsnd(\mathbf{m}, ?)) \rangle.t = \langle (\mathcal{C}, nsnd(\mathbf{m}, ?)) \rangle.t$		
Ch_6	$(\mathcal{C}_1, \eta).t + (\mathcal{C}_2, \eta).t = (\mathcal{C}_1, \eta).t, \mathcal{C}_1 \subseteq \mathcal{C}_2$		

Table 2: Axioms for process names.

$Unfold$	$A(u) = t[u/d], A(d : D) \stackrel{def}{=} t$
$Fold$	$\forall d : D \cdot t_1(d) = t_2[t_1(d_1)/A(d_1)] \cdots [t_1(d_n)/A(d_n)] \Rightarrow$ $t_1(d) = A(d), A(d : D) \stackrel{def}{=} t_2$ if A is guarded in t

(denoted by snd), the message is sent into the network (denoted by $nsnd$), irrespective of underlying topology (expressed by $\{\}$). Dep_2 expresses that when a protocol receives a message (denoted by rcv), it should receive it from the network (denoted by $nrcv$) while it is connected to some sender whose address is unknown (expressed by $\{? \rightsquigarrow \ell\}$). It should be noted that Dep_5 satisfies the second and third well-definedness rules given in Section 3.2.

The axioms $Sync_{1-3}$ explain the synchronization of two MANETs. The sending MANET $(\mathcal{C}_1, nsnd(\mathbf{m}_1, \ell)).t_1$ can communicate with the receiving MANET $(\mathcal{C}_2, nrcv(\mathbf{m}_2)).t_2$, if the receiving addresses (denoted by \mathcal{C}_2) are also connected to the sender ℓ (denoted by $\mathcal{C}_1 \cup \mathcal{C}_2[\ell/?]$). Likewise two receiving MANETs synchronize on a message when the receiving addresses of both MANETs are connected to the same unknown address (denoted by $\mathcal{C}_1 \cup \mathcal{C}_2$). Two sending MANETs cannot synchronize due to their signal collision. When a MANET is communicating through a τ action, it cannot be synchronized with another MANET, as indicated by axiom S_4 .

We return to the example at the end of Section 3.2. The behavior of

Table 3: Axioms for process names, deployment, left and communication merge, and parallel operators.

Dep_1	$\llbracket snd(\mathbf{m}).t \rrbracket_\ell = (\{\}, nsnd(\mathbf{m}, \ell)).\llbracket t \rrbracket_\ell$	Dep_4	$\llbracket 0 \rrbracket_\ell = 0$
Dep_2	$\llbracket rcv(\mathbf{m}).t \rrbracket_\ell = (\{? \rightsquigarrow \ell\}, nrcv(\mathbf{m})).\llbracket t \rrbracket_\ell$	Dep_5	$\llbracket \sum_{d:D} t \rrbracket_\ell = \sum_{d:D} \llbracket t \rrbracket_\ell$
Dep_3	$\llbracket t_1 + t_2 \rrbracket_\ell = \llbracket t_1 \rrbracket_\ell + \llbracket t_2 \rrbracket_\ell$		
Br	$t_1 \parallel t_2 = t_1 \ll t_2 + t_2 \ll t_1 + t_1 \mid t_2$	S_1	$t_1 \mid t_2 = t_2 \mid t_1$
LM_1	$(\mathcal{C}, \eta).t_1 \ll t_2 = (\mathcal{C}, \eta).(t_1 \parallel t_2)$	S_2	$(t_1 + t_2) \mid t_3 = t_1 \mid t_3 + t_2 \mid t_3$
LM_2	$(t_1 + t_2) \ll t_3 = t_1 \ll t_3 + t_2 \ll t_3$	S_3	$0 \mid t = 0$
LM_3	$0 \ll t = 0$	S_4	$(\mathcal{C}, \tau).t_1 \mid t_2 = 0$
LM_4	$(\sum_{d:D} t_1) \ll t_2 = \sum_{d:D} t_1 \ll t_2$	S_5	$(\sum_{d:D} t_1) \mid t_2 = \sum_{d:D} t_1 \mid t_2$
$Sync_1$	$(\mathcal{C}_1, nsnd(\mathbf{m}_1, \ell)).t_1 \mid (\mathcal{C}_2, nrcv(\mathbf{m}_2)).t_2 =$ $[eq(\mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{m}_2)](\mathcal{C}_1 \cup \mathcal{C}_2[\ell/?], nsnd(\mathbf{m}_1, \ell)).t_1 \parallel t_2 \diamond 0$		
$Sync_2$	$(\mathcal{C}_1, nrcv(\mathbf{m}_1)).t_1 \mid (\mathcal{C}_2, nrcv(\mathbf{m}_2)).t_2 =$ $[eq(\mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{m}_2)](\mathcal{C}_1 \cup \mathcal{C}_2, nrcv(\mathbf{m}_1)).t_1 \parallel t_2 \diamond 0$		
$Sync_3$	$(\mathcal{C}_1, nsnd(\mathbf{m}_1, \ell_1)).t_1 \mid (\mathcal{C}_2, nsnd(\mathbf{m}_2, \ell_2)).t_2 = 0$		

$\llbracket X(A) \rrbracket_A \parallel \llbracket Y(B) \rrbracket_B$ can be calculated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \llbracket X(A) \rrbracket_A \parallel \llbracket Y(B) \rrbracket_B = \\
& \quad \llbracket X(A) \rrbracket_A \ll \llbracket Y(B) \rrbracket_B + \llbracket Y(B) \rrbracket_B \ll \llbracket X(A) \rrbracket_A + \llbracket X(A) \rrbracket_A \mid \llbracket Y(B) \rrbracket_B \\
& \llbracket X(A) \rrbracket_A = (\{\}, nsnd(req(A), A)).\llbracket X(A) \rrbracket_A \\
& \llbracket Y(B) \rrbracket_B = \sum_{lx:Loc} (\{? \rightsquigarrow B\}, nrcv(req(lx))).\llbracket snd(rep(B, lx)).Y(B) \rrbracket_B \\
& \llbracket X(A) \rrbracket_A \ll \llbracket Y(B) \rrbracket_B = (\{\}, nsnd(req(A), A)).\llbracket X(A) \rrbracket_A \parallel \llbracket Y(B) \rrbracket_B \\
& \llbracket Y(B) \rrbracket_B \ll \llbracket X(A) \rrbracket_A = \\
& \quad \sum_{lx:Loc} (\{? \rightsquigarrow B\}, nrcv(req(lx))).\llbracket snd(rep(B, lx)).Y(B) \rrbracket_B \parallel \llbracket X(A) \rrbracket_A \\
& \llbracket X(A) \rrbracket_A \mid \llbracket Y(B) \rrbracket_B = \\
& \quad (\{A \rightsquigarrow B\}, nsnd(req(A), A)).\llbracket X(A) \rrbracket_A \parallel \llbracket snd(rep(B, A)).Y(B) \rrbracket_B
\end{aligned}$$

The axioms of hiding and encapsulation are given in Table 4. The *hiding* operator $(\nu\ell)_-$ conceals the address of a node with the address ℓ from external observers. Therefore, the behavior of a hidden node deploying process X , $(\nu C)\llbracket X(C) \rrbracket_C$, is $(\{\}, nsnd(req(?), ?)).(\nu C)\llbracket X(C) \rrbracket_C$. Then the behavior of $\llbracket X(A) \rrbracket_A \parallel (\nu C)\llbracket X(C) \rrbracket_C$, by application of axioms $Dep_{1,2}$, Res_2 , Br , LM_1 , $Sync_1$ and Ch_5 , equals $(\{\}, nsnd(req(A), A)).\llbracket X(A) \rrbracket_A \parallel (\nu C)\llbracket X(C) \rrbracket_C$. This indicates that $\llbracket X(A) \rrbracket_A \parallel (\nu C)\llbracket X(C) \rrbracket_C = \llbracket X(A) \rrbracket_A$, since both are a solution of $Z \stackrel{def}{=} (\{\}, nsnd(req(A), A)).Z$ by axiom *Fold*. Intuitively, the hidden node C does not change the behavior of $\llbracket X(A) \rrbracket_A$ from the point view of an external

Table 4: Axiomatization of hiding, abstraction and encapsulation operators.

Res_1	$(\nu\ell)(t_1 + t_2) = (\nu\ell)t_1 + (\nu\ell)t_2$	Res_3	$(\nu\ell)0 = 0$
Res_2	$(\nu\ell)(\mathcal{C}, \eta).t = (\mathcal{C}[\ell/?], \eta[\ell/?]).(\nu\ell)t$	Res_4	$(\nu\ell)\sum_{d:D} t = \sum_{d:D}(\nu\ell)t$
Ecp_1	$\partial_m((\mathcal{C}, nsnd(\mathbf{m}, \ell)).t) = (\mathcal{C}, nsnd(\mathbf{m}, \ell)).\partial_m(t)$		
Ecp_2	$\partial_m((\mathcal{C}, nrcv(\mathbf{m})).t) = [\neg isType_m(\mathbf{m})](\mathcal{C}, nrcv(\mathbf{m})).\partial_m(t) \diamond 0$		
Abs_1	$\tau_m((\mathcal{C}, \eta).t) = (\mathcal{C}, \tau_m(\eta)).\tau_m(t)$	Ecp_3	$\partial_m(t_1 + t_2) = \partial_m(t_1) + \partial_m(t_2)$
Abs_2	$\tau_m(t_1 + t_2) = \tau_m(t_1) + \tau_m(t_2)$	Ecp_4	$\partial_m(0) = 0$
Abs_3	$\tau_m(0) = 0$	Ecp_5	$\partial_m(\sum_{d:D} t) = \sum_{d:D} \partial_m(t)$
Abs_4	$\tau_m(\sum_{d:D} t) = \sum_{d:D} \tau_m(t)$		
T_1	$(\mathcal{C}, \eta).((\mathcal{C}', nrcv(\mathbf{m})).t + t) = (\mathcal{C}, \eta).t$		
T_2	$(\mathcal{C}, \eta).((\mathcal{C}', \tau).(t_1 + t_2) + t_2) = (\mathcal{C}, \eta).(t_1 + t_2)$		

observer, since it assumes the action of C belongs to A .

The axiom Abs_1 renames η actions carrying messages of type m to $\tau_m(\eta)$, which is defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \tau_m(nrcv(\mathbf{m})) &= if(isType_m(\mathbf{m}), \tau, nrcv(\mathbf{m})) \\ \tau_m(nsnd(\mathbf{m}, \ell)) &= if(isType_m(\mathbf{m}), \tau, nsnd(\mathbf{m}, \ell)) \end{aligned}$$

The axiom Ecp_2 explains that the *encapsulation* operator renames network receive actions of messages of type m to 0. For example,

$$\begin{aligned} \partial_{req}(\llbracket X(A) \rrbracket_A \parallel \llbracket Y(B) \rrbracket_B) = \\ (\{\}, nsnd(req(A), A)).\partial_{req}(\llbracket X(A) \rrbracket_A \parallel \llbracket Y(B) \rrbracket_B) + \\ (\{A \rightsquigarrow B\}, nsnd(req(A), A)).\partial_{req}(\llbracket X(A) \rrbracket_A \parallel \llbracket snd(rep(B, A)).Y(B) \rrbracket_B) \end{aligned}$$

Axiom T_1 removes a receive action that does not affect the behavior of a network, while T_2 removes a τ action which preserves the behavior of a network after some topology changes. The remaining axioms in this table are straightforward.

4. Case Study: A Simple Routing Protocol

We consider a simple routing protocol, which is similar to AODV [17] in its basic concepts. In a MANET, each node can communicate with other nodes indirectly by exploiting a routing protocol. In these protocols, all nodes act

as router and relay messages to the next hop for an intended destination. To this aim, each node keeps the address of the next hop for some destinations in a *routing table*. When a node needs to transmit data to a destination, it first retrieves in its routing table the address of the next hop to which it should send data. If the next hop is unknown, it initiates the *route discovery process*. In this process, the node broadcasts a $req(dst, adr)$ message, where adr is the address of the node itself, to ask its neighbors whether they know a route to a node with address dst . On receiving a $req(dst, src)$ message, a node examines its routing table; if it knows a route to the destination, it replies by sending a $rep(dst, adr, src)$ message, where adr and src are the addresses of the receiving and requesting nodes respectively. Otherwise it rebroadcasts req by substituting src for its own address. Each node, upon receiving the $rep(dst, nx, adr)$ message, updates its routing table by setting the address of the next hop for dst to nx , and relays the message to its requesting neighbor, if it is not the initiator of route discovery. When a node with address adr detects that its route to dst is not valid anymore due to a link break-down, it broadcasts the message $error(dst, adr)$ to inform its neighbors that it cannot be used as a router to dst . If a node that uses the address nx as the next hop for transmitting data to dst receives $error(dst, nx)$, then it erases this routing record in its routing table, and informs its neighbors by replacing nx by its own address.

4.1. Protocol Specification

To ease the process of verification, we decompose the specification of the protocol into three processes, namely initiator, middle and destination. The initiator node delivers its data to a middle node, to route its data to the destination. The middle nodes find a route to the destination node, update this route with regard to topology changes, and carry data along a route. The destination node replies to requests, and receives data destined for it.

We specify a network composed of four nodes, where one nodes deploys the initiator process, two nodes the middle process, and one node the destination process. Since we focus on finding a route to a specific dst , we model the routing table with a variable nx of sort *Loc*, and remove dst from the parameter list of messages like req , rep and $error$. The specifications of the initiator, middle and destination processes, called *Init*, *Mid* and *Dst* respectively, are given in Figure 5. Process *RtDy* specifies the route discovery process; src denotes the node for which the route discovery process was initiated and should be replied.

Figure 5: The specifications of the initiator, middle and destination processes.

$$\begin{aligned}
Init(adr, dst : Loc) &\stackrel{def}{=} \\
&\sum_{lx:Loc} [\neg eq(lx, ?) \wedge \neg eq(lx, adr) \wedge \neg eq(lx, dst)] snd(data(lx)).0 \diamond 0 \\
Mid(nx : Loc, adr : Loc) &\stackrel{def}{=} \\
&[\neg(eq(nx, ?))](\\
&\quad \sum_{lx:Loc} rcv(data(lx)). \\
&\quad [eq(lx, adr)] snd(data(nx)).Mid(nx, adr) \diamond Mid(nx, adr) + \\
&\quad \sum_{lx:Loc} rcv(error(lx)). \\
&\quad [eq(lx, nx)] snd(error(adr)).RtDy(adr, ?) \diamond Mid(nx, adr) + \\
&\quad snd(error(adr)).RtDy(adr, ?) + \\
&\quad \sum_{lx:Loc} rcv(req(lx)).snd(rep(adr, lx)).Mid(nx, adr) + \\
&\quad \diamond (RtDy(adr, ?) + \\
&\quad \sum_{lx:Loc} rcv(req(lx)).RtDy(adr, lx)) \\
RtDy(adr : Loc, src : Loc : Bool) &\stackrel{def}{=} \\
&snd(req(adr)). \\
&(\sum_{lx:Loc} \sum_{ly:Loc} rcv(rep(lx, ly)).(\\
&\quad [eq(ly, adr)] \\
&\quad [\neg eq(src, ?)] snd(rep(adr, src)).Mid(lx, adr) \diamond Mid(lx, adr) \\
&\quad \diamond RtDy(adr, src) + RtDy(adr, src)) \\
Dst(adr : Loc) &\stackrel{def}{=} \\
&\sum_{lx:Loc} rcv(req(lx)).snd(rep(adr, lx), 0).Dst(adr) + \\
&\sum_{lx:Loc} rcv(data(lx)).[eq(lx, adr)]0 \diamond Dst(adr).
\end{aligned}$$

4.2. Protocol Analysis

The most fundamental error in routing protocol operations is failure to route correctly. The correct operation of MANET routing protocols can be defined as follows [18]: *If from some point in time on there exists a path between two nodes, then the protocol must be able to find some path between the nodes. Furthermore, when a path has been found, and for the time it stays valid, it must be possible to send packets along the path from the source node to the destination node.* A situation which violates the above property is a routing loop, meaning that somewhere along the path from the source to its destination a packet can enter a forwarding circle. We are going to examine whether our simple routing protocol is loop-free. To this aim, we encode the processes in mCRL2, to derive the *CLTS* of the MANET:

$$\mathcal{M}_0 \equiv \partial_{\{req, rep, error, data\}}(\llbracket Init(A, D) \rrbracket_A \parallel \llbracket Mid(?, B) \rrbracket_B \parallel \llbracket Mid(?, C) \rrbracket_C \parallel \llbracket Dst(D) \rrbracket_D).$$

With regard to the fourth well-definedness rule, and by application of axioms Dep_{1-5} , $Con_{1,2}$ and $Fold$, for every *CNT* term $\llbracket t(d) \rrbracket_\ell$, there is a network name $A(d : D) \stackrel{def}{=} t'$, where $A \in \mathcal{A}_n$, such that $\llbracket t(d) \rrbracket_\ell = A(d)$. To encode \mathcal{M}_0 , we first derive equivalent network names for $\llbracket Init(\ell, \ell') \rrbracket_\ell$, $\llbracket Mid(\ell', \ell, b) \rrbracket_\ell$, and $\llbracket Dst(\ell) \rrbracket_\ell$, namely $Init_n(\ell, \ell')$, $Mid_n(\ell', \ell, b)$, and $Dst_n(\ell)$.

The only difference between parallel composition of mCRL2 and *CNT* is on their synchronization part; in mCRL2, two actions are synchronized if they agree on the number and values of their parameters, while in *CNT* two actions are synchronized if they agree on the message part, while some calculations are performed on their network constraints (see axioms $Sync_{1-3}$). To model the local broadcast communication of *CNT* by the parallel composition of mCRL2, we define a set of actions $nsnd_i, nrcv_j : \mathbb{C} \times Msg \times Loc$, where $0 \leq i, \leq n, 1 \leq j \leq n$ with n the number of nodes. The action $nrcv_i(\{\ell \rightsquigarrow \ell_1, \dots, \ell_i\}, \mathbf{m}, \ell)$ denotes that the message \mathbf{m} , when sent by the node with address ℓ , can be received by i nodes with addresses ℓ_1, \dots, ℓ_i , because they are connected to the sender. And $nsnd_i(\{\ell \rightsquigarrow \ell_1, \dots, \ell_i\}, \mathbf{m}, \ell)$ denotes that the node with address ℓ sends the message \mathbf{m} while i nodes with addresses ℓ_1, \dots, ℓ_i are connected to it and consequently can receive \mathbf{m} . To model the network constraint calculations, each $(\{\}, nsnd(\mathbf{m}, \ell)).t$ and $(\{\ell \rightsquigarrow \ell\}, nrcv(\mathbf{m}).t)$ (resulting from the axioms $Dep_{1,2}$ in the previous step) is encoded as

$$\begin{aligned} & (\{\}, nsnd(\mathbf{m}, \ell)).t : \\ & nsnd_0(\{\}, \mathbf{m}, \ell).t + \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \sum_{\ell_1:Loc} ([\neg eq(\ell, \ell_1)] nsnd_1(\{\ell \rightsquigarrow \ell_1\}, \mathbf{m}, \ell).t \diamond 0 + \\
& \sum_{\ell_2:Loc} ([\neg eq(\ell, \ell_2) \wedge \neg eq(\ell_1, \ell_2)] nsnd_2(\{\ell \rightsquigarrow \ell_1, \ell_2\}, \mathbf{m}, \ell).t \diamond 0 + \\
& \dots + \\
& \sum_{\ell_n:Loc} ([\neg eq(\ell, \ell_n) \wedge \dots \wedge \neg eq(\ell_{n-1}, \ell_n)] nsnd_n(\{\ell \rightsquigarrow \ell_1, \dots, \ell_n\}, \mathbf{m}, \ell).t \diamond 0) \dots) \\
& (\{? \rightsquigarrow \ell\}, nrcv(\mathbf{m})).t : \\
& \sum_{\ell_1:Loc} ([\neg eq(\ell, \ell_1)] nrcv_1(\{\ell_1 \rightsquigarrow \ell\}, \mathbf{m}, \ell_1).t \diamond 0 + \\
& \sum_{\ell_2:Loc} ([\neg eq(\ell, \ell_2) \wedge \neg eq(\ell_1, \ell_2)] nrcv_2(\{\ell_1 \rightsquigarrow \ell, \ell_2\}, \mathbf{m}, \ell_1).t \diamond 0 + \\
& \dots + \\
& \sum_{\ell_n:Loc} ([\neg eq(\ell, \ell_n) \wedge \dots \wedge \neg eq(\ell_{n-1}, \ell_n)] nrcv_n(\{\ell_1 \rightsquigarrow \ell, \ell_2, \dots, \ell_n\}, \mathbf{m}, \ell_1).t \diamond 0) \dots)
\end{aligned}$$

where the sum, choice, conditional and action prefix operators are mCRL2 constructs with the same semantics as in *CNT*. A *CNT* term t with its network receive and send actions encoded as above is denoted by $\mathfrak{S}(t)$. The *CNT* term $\partial_{\widetilde{M}}(t_1 \parallel \dots \parallel t_n)$, where \widetilde{M} is the set of all messages, is modeled by the mCRL2 operators renaming ρ , allow ∇ , communication Γ , and parallel \parallel , where $\rho_{\{a \rightarrow b\}}$ renames the action name a to b , $\nabla_{\{a\}}$ renames all actions except a to deadlock, and $\Gamma_{\{a|b \rightarrow c\}}$ renames synchronized actions a and b to c :

$$\rho_{\{nsnd_0 \rightarrow nsnd\}} (\nabla_{\{nsnd_0, nsnd\}} (\Gamma_{\{nsnd_1 | nrcv_1 \rightarrow nsnd, \dots, nsnd_n | \underbrace{nrcv_n | \dots | nrcv_n \rightarrow nsnd}_{n \text{ items}}\}} (\mathfrak{S}(t_1) \parallel \dots \parallel \mathfrak{S}(t_n))))).$$

Thus, the encoding of \mathcal{M}_0 is achieved by setting n to 4, and t_1 , t_2 , t_3 and t_4 to $Init_n(A, D)$, $Mid_n(?, B)$, $Mid_n(?, C)$, and $Dst_n(D)$ in the above formula. The labeled transition system resulting from this encoding contains labels of the form $nsnd(\mathcal{C}, \mathbf{m}, \ell)$. Since only middle nodes look for a route to the destination, the loop can only occur between the middle nodes B and C . Therefore we can examine the existence of a loop by the following regular μ -calculus formula [19]:

$$\langle true^* \rangle \langle nsnd(\{B \rightsquigarrow C\}, data(C), B) \rangle \langle nsnd(\{C \rightsquigarrow B\}, data(B), C) \rangle true$$

where $\langle true^* \rangle$ at the start of the formula denotes any system trace, and $true$ at the end of the formula any state. The CADP model checker confirms that the above property holds, and returns the following execution:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{M}_0 &\xrightarrow{nsnd(\{B \rightsquigarrow C\}, req(B), B)} \mathcal{M}_1 \xrightarrow{nsnd(\{C \rightsquigarrow D\}, req(C), C)} \mathcal{M}_2 \xrightarrow{nsnd(\{D \rightsquigarrow C\}, rep(D, C), D)} \mathcal{M}_3 \\
\mathcal{M}_3 &\xrightarrow{nsnd(\{C \rightsquigarrow B\}, rep(C, B), C)} \mathcal{M}_4 \xrightarrow{nsnd(\{\}, error(C), C)} \mathcal{M}_5 \xrightarrow{nsnd(\{C \rightsquigarrow B, D\}, req(C), C)} \mathcal{M}_6 \\
\mathcal{M}_6 &\xrightarrow{nsnd(\{B \rightsquigarrow C\}, rep(B, C), B)} \mathcal{M}_7 \xrightarrow{nsnd(\{A \rightsquigarrow B\}, data(B), A)} \mathcal{M}_8 \\
\mathcal{M}_8 &\xrightarrow{nsnd(\{B \rightsquigarrow C\}, data(C), B)} \mathcal{M}_9 \xrightarrow{nsnd(\{C \rightsquigarrow B\}, data(B), C)} \mathcal{M}_8 \dots
\end{aligned}$$

From this one can derive the following scenario during which a loop is formed. Let B have a route to D through C (Figure 6(1)), and then the link between C and D goes down. Next B loses the *error* message because of a temporary link failure between C and B (Figure 6(2)). Then the link between C and B becomes valid and C requests a path to D (Figure 6(3)). Finally B replies and a loop is formed (Figure 6(4)). This scenario complies to the scenario explained in [20]. However, there the model is verified against a specific mobility scenario, while in our approach the model is verified against many instances of mobility scenarios at the same time. Therefore, as explained in Section 2, we can derive mobility scenarios leading to the (undesired) property.




Figure 6: A scenario leading to a loop formation in the simple routing protocol.

A solution to prevent loop-formation is assigning a sequence number to each route, to track changes in the underlying topology (and using hop counts to choose the shorter path). When there is a topology change, the sequence number is incremented. Thus the protocol is refined as follows: each node sends its *req* by appending its known sequence number (for the destination),

to indicate the freshness of the route required. Each node also keeps the sequence number for each destination in its routing table, and replies to a request only if its sequence number is at least as much as the one in the request message. When a route expires, the node should keep the incremented sequence number for that destination, to remember the sequence number for which it should initiate the request, as remarked in [20]. We have also experienced this in model checking, as otherwise a loop is formed.

We revised our code by assigning a sequence number (and a hop count) to each route (as shown in Section 5.4). To keep the state space finite, we specified that a *Mid* process can only detect a link breakage once, since it causes an increase in the sequence number. By model checking we are sure that the protocol is correct for scenarios leading to one link breakage with three middle nodes. We will verify the correctness of the improved protocol for an arbitrary number of link breakages and number of middle nodes in Section 5.4, using a symbolic verification technique.

5. Symbolic Verification

To prove the correctness of a communication protocol, it is common to prove a network composed of a number of nodes each deploying the protocol—referred to as the *implementation*-equivalent to a more abstract description—the *specification*- of the desired external behavior.

We rephrase the question whether the implementation of a MANET and its specification are equivalent in terms of proof obligations on relations between data objects. This technique is based on the cones and foci method [6]. A restricted class of *CNT* specifications, called linear computed network equations, are considered, in which the states are data objects. To prove equivalence of an implementation and a specification, given in this linear format, a *state mapping* between the data objects of the implementation and specification is given. The proof is completed by showing that the state mapping constitutes a branching computed network bisimulation.

5.1. Linear Computed Network Equations and Invariants

A linear computed network equation (LCNE) is a computed network term consisting of only action prefix, summation and conditional operators; it does not contain any parallel, encapsulation, abstraction and hiding operators. An LCNE is basically a vector of data parameters together with a list of condition, action and effect triples, describing for each state under which

condition an action may happen and what is its effect on the vector of data parameters. Each computed network term can be transformed into an LCNE using the axioms (cf. [21]). In this paper we do not discuss the algorithm transforming a network specification into an LCNE, but will only consider one example in Section 5.3.

Without loss of generality, we assume that each message constructor has exactly one parameter. Let the set of (concrete) actions be $Act^c = \{nsnd(m(-), \ell), nrcv(m(-)) \mid \forall m : D_m \rightarrow Msg, \forall \ell \in Loc\}$, ranged over by $\eta(-)$.

Definition 4. *A linear computed network equation is a CNT specification of the form*

$$A(d : D) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{\eta : Act^c \cup \{\tau\}} \sum_{e : E} [h_\eta(d, e)](\mathcal{C}_\eta(d, e), \eta(f_\eta(d, e))). A(g_\eta(d, e)) \diamond 0$$

where $h_\eta : D \times E \rightarrow Bool$, $\mathcal{C}_\eta : D \times E \rightarrow \mathbb{C}$, $f_\eta : D \times E \rightarrow D_m$ and $g_\eta : D \times E \rightarrow D$ for each $\eta \in Act^c \cup \{\tau\}$.

The LCNE in Definition 4 has exactly one *CLTS* as its solution (modulo strong bisimilarity). In this *CLTS*, the states are data elements $d : D$, where D may be a Cartesian product of n data types, i.e. (d_1, \dots, d_n) , the transition labels are the network send and receive actions of messages parameterized with data, and the transition constraints are network constraints parameterized with data. The LCNE expresses that state d can send/receive message $\eta(f_\eta(d, e))$ for the set of topologies specified by $\mathcal{C}_\eta(d, e)$ to end up in state $g_\eta(d, e)$ under the condition that $h_\eta(d, e)$ is true.

Definition 5. *A mapping $\mathcal{I} : D \rightarrow Bool$ is an invariant for an LCNE, written as in Definition 4, if for all $\eta \in Act^c \cup \{\tau\}$, $d : D$ and $e : E$,*

$$\mathcal{I}(d) \wedge h_\eta(d, e) \Rightarrow \mathcal{I}(g_\eta(d, e)).$$

Invariants can be used to characterize the set of reachable states of an LCNE. Namely, if $\mathcal{I}(d)$ and it is possible to perform $\eta(f_\eta(d, e))$ (since $h_\eta(d, e)$ holds), then \mathcal{I} holds in the resulting state $g_\eta(d, e)$.

5.2. Equivalence Checking by using State Mappings

The system implementation and specification, both given in linear format, are branching computed network bisimilar, if there exists a state mapping ϕ

between them satisfies the transfer conditions of Definition 2. An invariant \mathcal{I} can be imposed; then the transfer conditions only need to hold in states where \mathcal{I} is true, and consequently equivalence between implementation and specification is only guaranteed to hold in states where \mathcal{I} is true.

To allow infinite sequences of τ -transitions in the implementation, we leave the abstraction operator $\tau_{\widetilde{M}}$ around it, to ensure that it has a unique solution. The set of communications over \widetilde{M} is defined by $I_{\widetilde{M}}$ as

$$\{nsnd(\mathcal{C}, \mathbf{m}, \ell), nrcv(\mathcal{C}, \mathbf{m}) \mid \exists m \in \widetilde{M} \cdot isType_m(\mathbf{m})\}.$$

Let $\langle \eta \rangle$ denote η or, $\eta[\ell/?]$ and η is of the form $nsnd(\mathbf{m}, ?)$. Depending on the value of $\langle \eta \rangle$, for any binary relation \odot , $r_\eta(e, d) \odot r'_{\langle \eta \rangle}(e, d')$ iff $r_\eta(e, d) \odot r'_\eta(e, d')$ or $r_\eta(e, d)[\ell/?] \odot r'_{\eta[\ell/?]}(e, d')$.

Proposition 1. *Let the LCNE Imp be of the form*

$$Imp(d : D) \stackrel{def}{=} \sum_{\eta \in Act^c \cup \{\tau\}} \sum_{e : E} [h_\eta(d, e)](\mathcal{C}_\eta(d, e), \eta(f_\eta(d, e))). Imp(g_\eta(d, e)) \diamond 0$$

Furthermore, let the LCNE Spec be of the form

$$Spec(d' : D') \stackrel{def}{=} \sum_{\eta \in Act^c \setminus I_{\widetilde{M}}} \sum_{e : E} [h'_\eta(d', e)](\mathcal{C}'_\eta(d', e), \eta(f'_\eta(d', e))). Spec(g'_\eta(d', e)) \diamond 0$$

Let $\mathcal{I} : D \rightarrow Bool$ be an invariant for Imp , and $\phi : D \rightarrow D'$ a state mapping. If for all $\eta \in Act^c \setminus I_{\widetilde{M}}$ and $\eta_\tau \in I_{\widetilde{M}}$, ϕ satisfies the following conditions:

1. $\forall e : E (h_{\eta_\tau}(d, e) \Rightarrow \phi(d) = \phi(g_{\eta_\tau}(d, e)))$;
2. $\forall e : E, h_\eta(d, e)$ implies that either η is a receive action such that $\phi(d) = \phi(g_\eta(d, e))$, or $h'_{\langle \eta \rangle}(\phi(d), e)$ holds for some $\langle \eta \rangle$ such that $f_\eta(d, e) = f'_{\langle \eta \rangle}(\phi(d), e)$, $\mathcal{C}'_{\langle \eta \rangle}(\phi(d), e) \subseteq \mathcal{C}_\eta(d, e)$, and $\phi(g_\eta(d, e)) = g'_{\langle \eta \rangle}(\phi(d), e)$;
3. $\forall e : E, h'_\eta(\phi(d), e)$ implies that either η is a receive action such that $\phi(d) = g'_\eta(\phi(d), e)$, or there exists d^* such that $d \xrightarrow{\eta_{\tau_1}}_{\mathcal{C}_1} \dots \xrightarrow{\eta_{\tau_n}}_{\mathcal{C}_n} d^*$, where $\eta_{\tau_1}, \dots, \eta_{\tau_n} \in I_{\widetilde{M}}$, and for some $\langle \eta \rangle$, $h_{\langle \eta \rangle}(d^*, e)$ holds with $f_{\langle \eta \rangle}(d^*, e) = f'_\eta(\phi(d), e)$, $\mathcal{C}_{\langle \eta \rangle}(d^*, e) \subseteq \mathcal{C}'_\eta(\phi(d), e)$, and $\phi(g_{\langle \eta \rangle}(d^*, e)) = g'_\eta(\phi(d), e)$;

then for all $d : D$ with $\mathcal{I}(d)$, $\tau_{\widetilde{M}}(Imp(d)) \simeq_b Spec(\phi(d))$.

See Appendix A for the proof. Since each state of the specification defines the external behavior of the implementation with regard to any possible topology changes, the mapped state of the implementation should not be changed by τ -transitions (which may be triggered due to some topology changes), as implied by the first criterion. And each state of the implementation has the same observable behavior as its mapped state in the specification, directly or after some some topology changes, as implied by the second and third criterion.

Due to mobility of nodes, MANET protocols usually contain mechanisms to examine if a node connection to some other node exists or not. For instance, a node may examine whether it is still connected to its next hop for a destination in a routing protocol, or to its leader in a leader election protocol. Such mechanisms are modeled by non-deterministic behavior in the protocol specification, which restarts some part of the process (like route discovery in a routing protocol). Due to such mechanisms, in each state of the implementation, the observable behavior may change after a set of τ -transitions. On the other hand, since we assume arbitrary mobility for MANET nodes, each state of the specification defines the behavior of a MANET for any possible topology change. Therefore, we lack a collection of so-called focus points [6, 7]: states in the implementation that can be matched to some state in the specification with the same observable behavior.

For example, to show that $\forall n : Nat \cdot N(n) \simeq_b M(n)$, where

$$\begin{aligned} N(n : Nat) &\stackrel{def}{=} [n \geq 1](\{\}, nsnd(data(B), A)).N(n + 1) \diamond 0 + \\ &\quad [n \geq 0](\{\}, nsnd(data(B), ?)).N(n + 2) \diamond 0 \\ M(b : Bool) &\stackrel{def}{=} [eq(b, T)](\{\}, nsnd(data(B), A)).M(b) \diamond 0 \end{aligned}$$

it suffices to show that $\phi(n) = if(n \geq 1, T, F)$ satisfies the second and third conditions of Proposition 1 (as there is no abstraction):

- When $n \geq 1$ holds, two actions $\eta_1 \equiv nsnd(data(-), A)$ and $\eta_2 \equiv nsnd(data(-), ?)$ are possible. For the first action, $f_{\eta_1}(n) = B$, $\mathcal{C}_{\eta_1}(n) = \{\}$, and $g_{\eta_1}(n) = n + 1$. Since $\phi(n) = T$, $h'_{\eta_1}(T)$ while $f_{\eta_1}(n) = f'_{\eta_1}(T)$, $\mathcal{C}'_{\eta_1}(T) \subseteq \mathcal{C}_{\eta_1}(n)$, and $\phi(g_{\eta_1}(n)) = g'_{\eta_1}(T)$. For the second action, $f_{\eta_2}(n) = B$, $\mathcal{C}_{\eta_2}(n) = \{\}$, and $g_{\eta_2}(n) = n + 2$. The only action of M is again matched to this action, since $\langle nsnd(data(-), ?) \rangle = nsnd(data(-), A)$, while $f_{\eta_2}(n) = f'_{\langle \eta_2 \rangle}(T)$, $\mathcal{C}'_{\langle \eta_2 \rangle}(T) \subseteq \mathcal{C}_{\eta_2}(n)$, and $\phi(g_{\eta_2}(n)) = g'_{\langle \eta_2 \rangle}(T)$.

- The only action of M when $eq(\phi(n \geq 1), T)$ is $\eta \equiv nsnd(data(-), A)$, and the same action is enabled in N when $n \geq 1$, with the same parameter and network constraint.

5.3. Linearization of Uniform MANETs

In practice a MANET often consists of an arbitrary set of similar nodes: each node is identified by a unique network address, and deploys the same protocols. In this section we show how our symbolic verification approach can be exploited to verify such networks. To this aim, we first provide a general recursive specification for MANETs with similar nodes, and then derive a linear computed network equation as a solution of the recursive specification, using the *CNT* axioms, data axioms and induction. The derived linear equation is strongly bisimilar to the original recursive equation.

Without loss of generality, we assume that each message constructor has exactly one parameter. We assume that each process $P(\ell, d)$ is defined using a linear process equation (LPE) [22] of the form:

$$P(\ell : Loc, d : D) \stackrel{def}{=} \sum_{m \in Msg} \sum_{e : E_m} [h_{m_s}(\ell, d, e)] snd(m(f_{m_s}(\ell, d, e))).P(\ell, g_{m_s}(\ell, d, e)) \diamond 0 + [h_{m_r}(\ell, d, e)] rcv(m(f_{m_r}(\ell, d, e))).P(\ell, g_{m_r}(\ell, d, e)) \diamond 0 \quad (1)$$

where $h_{m_s/m_r} : Loc \times D \times E_m \rightarrow Bool$, $f_{m_s/m_r} : Loc \times D \times E_m \rightarrow D_m$ and $g_{m_s/m_r} : Loc \times D \times E_m \rightarrow D$ for each $m \in Msg$.

As we do not want to fix the addresses of nodes in the MANET beforehand, we use two auxiliary data sorts: *LocList* which is a list of network addresses of nodes, and similar to the approach of [9], *DTable* which is a table indexed by network addresses, where each entry maintains the state of the node at the corresponding network address. We also exploit for each $m \in Msg$ an auxiliary data sort *EList_m*, which is a list of elements of sort E_m , the auxiliary data type used in functions of messages (see equation 1).

The sort *LocList* is defined below. Lists are generated from the empty list *empL* and *add*, which places a new address in the list. The function *has* examines if an element belongs to the list; *include* examines if the first list is included in the second list; *remove* removes an address from the list; *head* returns the first element of the list; *size* returns the length of the list; *nodup* examines if the list has no duplicated item; and *eq* compares two lists.

To increase readability, we write binary functions in infix manner, and use symbols $\emptyset, \triangleright, \in, \subseteq, \setminus, ||$ and $\ell[0]$ for *empL*, *add*, *has*, *include*, *remove*,

$size$ and $head(\ell)$, respectively. The data sort $EList_m$ for $m \in Msg$ is defined in the same way as $LocList$, but using the constant $empE_m$.

<i>sort</i>	$LocList$	
<i>func</i>	$empL : \rightarrow LocList$	
	$add : Loc \times LocList \rightarrow LocList$	
<i>map</i>	$has : Loc \times LocList \rightarrow Bool$	
	$include, eq : LocList \times LocList \rightarrow Bool$	
	$remove : LocList \times Loc \rightarrow LocList$	
	$head : LocList \rightarrow Loc$	
	$size : LocList \rightarrow Nat$	
	$nodup : LocList \rightarrow Bool$	
<i>var</i>	$\ell, \ell_1, \ell_2 : LocList, \ell, \ell_1, \ell_2 : Loc$	
<i>rew</i>	$has(\ell, empL) = F$	LA_1
	$has(\ell_1, add(\ell_2, \ell)) = if(eq(\ell_1, \ell_2), T, has(\ell_1, \ell))$	LA_2
	$include(empL, \ell) = T$	LA_3
	$include(add(\ell, \ell_1), \ell_2) = has(\ell, \ell_2) \wedge include(\ell_1, \ell_2)$	LA_4
	$remove(empL, \ell) = empL$	LA_5
	$remove(add(\ell_1, \ell), \ell_2) =$	
	$if(eq(\ell_1, \ell_2), remove(\ell, \ell_2), add(\ell_1, remove(\ell, \ell_2)))$	LA_6
	$head(add(\ell, \ell)) = \ell$	LA_7
	$size(empL) = 0$	LA_9
	$size(add(\ell, \ell)) = size(\ell) + 1$	LA_{10}
	$nodup(empL) = T$	LA_{11}
	$nodup(add(\ell, \ell)) = \neg has(\ell, \ell) \wedge nodup(\ell)$	LA_{12}
	$eq(\ell_1, \ell_2) = include(\ell_1, \ell_2) \wedge include(\ell_2, \ell_1)$	LA_{13}

Tables are generated from the constant $empT$ and an operation upd , which places a new entry in the table. The function get gets an entry from the table using its index. The function $upd_all_{g_m}(\ell \triangleright \ell, e \triangleright el, dt)$ updates the list of entries $\ell \triangleright \ell$ in the table using the function $g_m : Loc \times D \times E_m \rightarrow D$; the entry ℓ is updated by $g_m(\ell, get(\ell, dt), e)$, which uses the network address ℓ , the previous value at the entry, and an auxiliary value e . Intuitively this function is helpful to update a set of receiver nodes that communicate with a sender over message m . Similarly the function $and_all_{h_m, f_m, f'_m}(\ell_1 \triangleright \ell, \ell_2, e_2, e_1 \triangleright el, dt)$ examines a boolean expression on a list of entries $\ell_1 \triangleright \ell$ using functions $h_m : Loc \times D \times E_m \rightarrow Bool$ and $f_m, f'_m : Loc \times D \times E_m \rightarrow D_m$; for each entry ℓ_1 , it examines if $h_m(\ell_1, get(\ell_1, dt), e_1)$ evaluates to true and if $f'_m(\ell_1, get(\ell_1, dt), e_1)$ is equal to $f_m(\ell_2, get(\ell_2, dt), e_2)$. Intuitively this function is helpful to examine if a set of nodes can synchronize with each

other upon receiving a message of type m , i.e., whether the conditions of their actions are true (examined by h_m) and their message parameters are equal to each other (examined by f_m, f'_m).

```

sort   DTable
func   empT :→ DTable
         upd : Loc × D × DTable → DTable
map   get : Loc × DTable → D
         upd_all_{g_m} : LocList × EList_m × DTable → DTable
         and_all_{h_m, f_m, f'_m} : LocList × Loc × E_m × EList_m × DTable → Bool
var   ℓ, ℓ_1, ℓ_2 : Loc, ℓℓ : LocList,
         d : D, dt : DTable,
         e, e_1, e_2 : E_m, el : EList_m
rew   get(ℓ_1, upd(ℓ_2, d, dt)) = if(eq(ℓ_1, ℓ_2), d, get(ℓ_1, dt))           TA1
         upd_all_{g_m}(empL, el, dt) = dt                                       TA2
         upd_all_{g_m}(add(ℓ, ℓℓ), add(e, el), dt) =
           upd(ℓ, g_m(ℓ, get(ℓ, dt), e), upd_all_{g_m}(ℓℓ, el, dt))           TA3
         and_all_{h_m, f_m, f'_m}(empL, ℓ, e, el, dt) = T                         TA4
         and_all_{h_m, f_m, f'_m}(add(ℓ_1, ℓℓ), ℓ_2, e_2, add(e_1, el), dt) =
           and(h_m(ℓ_1, get(ℓ_1, dt), e_1), and(eq(f_m(ℓ_2, get(ℓ_2, dt), e_2),
           f'_m(ℓ_1, get(ℓ_1, dt), e_1))), and_all_{h_m, f_m, f'_m}(ℓℓ, ℓ_2, e_2, el, dt)) TA5

```

Axioms TA_{2-5} are schematic and can be defined for all functions g_{m_s/m_r} , h_{m_s/m_r} , f_{m_s/m_r} in equation (1) for any $m \in Msg$.

In the remainder we write $dt[\ell]$ instead of $get(\ell, dt)$. The following network recursive specification puts nodes deploying process P at network addresses of $\ell\ell$ in parallel.

$$\begin{aligned}
Manet(\ell\ell : LocList, dt : DTable) &\stackrel{def}{=} \\
&[eq(\ell\ell, \emptyset)]0 \diamond \llbracket P(\ell\ell[0], dt[\ell\ell[0]]) \rrbracket_{\ell\ell[0]} \parallel Manet(\ell\ell \setminus \ell\ell[0], dt).
\end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

Below we present the core lemma of this section. It gives an expansion of $Manet$, where all operators for parallelism have been removed. The resulting network has the list $\ell\ell$ and the table dt as parameters. In essence, the complexity of the computed network $Manet$ is now encoded using the list and table operations.

Lemma 1 says that in the network X , the node with network address $k \in \ell\ell$ may send the message m , parameterized by data from this node, if it is ready to send (as indicated by $h_{m_s}(k, dt[k], e)$) to a list ℓ_s (without duplicates) of receiver nodes with addresses in $\ell\ell \setminus k$ that are all ready to receive such

a message (examined by $and_all_{h_{m_r}, f_{m_s}, f_{m_r}}$). Table entries with indices in ℓ_s and k are updated as a result of this communication (using $upd_all_{g_{m_r}}$). The function $\mathcal{C}(\ell, \ell_s) = \{\ell \rightsquigarrow \ell' \mid \ell' \in \ell_s\}$ specifies the network constraint for this behavior of the network, indicating there is a communication link from ℓ to each node in ℓ_s . Nodes in the network X may also receive a message m from an unknown address $?$; the receiving nodes must have network addresses in ℓ_s , where $\ell_s \subseteq \ell \wedge \neg eq(\ell_s, \emptyset) \wedge nodup(\ell_s)$, and must be ready to receive such a message (examined by $and_all_{h_{m_r}, f_{m_r}, f_{m_r}}$). All table entries with indices in ℓ_s are updated as a result of this receive action (using $upd_all_{g_{m_r}}$).

Lemma 1. *The MANET Manet as defined in equations 1 and 2 is a solution for the MANET X in equation 3 below.*

$$\begin{aligned}
X(\ell : LocList, dt : DTable) &\stackrel{def}{=} \\
&\sum_{m \in Msg} \sum_{k:Loc} \sum_{\ell_s:LocList} \sum_{e:E_m} \sum_{el:EList_m} \\
&\quad [k \in \ell \wedge \ell_s \subseteq \ell \setminus k \wedge nodup(\ell_s) \wedge |\ell_s| = |el| \wedge \\
&\quad \quad h_{m_s}(k, dt[k], e) \wedge and_all_{h_{m_r}, f_{m_s}, f_{m_r}}(\ell_s, k, e, el, dt)] \\
&\quad (\mathcal{C}(k, \ell_s), nsnd(m(f_{m_s}(k, dt[k], e)), k)). \\
&\quad \quad X(\ell, upd(k, g_{m_s}(k, dt[k], e), upd_all_{g_{m_r}}(\ell_s, el, dt))) \diamond 0 + \quad (3) \\
&\sum_{m \in Msg} \sum_{\ell_s:LocList} \sum_{el:EList_m} \\
&\quad [\ell_s \subseteq \ell \wedge \neg eq(\ell_s, \emptyset) \wedge nodup(\ell_s) \wedge |\ell_s| = |el| \wedge \\
&\quad \quad and_all_{h_{m_r}, f_{m_r}, f_{m_r}}(\ell_s, \ell_s[0], el[0], el, dt)] \\
&\quad (\mathcal{C}(?, \ell_s), nrcv(m(f_{m_r}(\ell_s[0], dt[\ell_s[0]], el[0])))). \\
&\quad \quad X(\ell, upd_all_{g_{m_r}}(\ell_s, el, dt)) \diamond 0.
\end{aligned}$$

See [14] for the proof. The following Composition Theorem is a corollary of Lemma 1 and the axiom *Fold*.

Theorem 1. $Manet(\ell, dt) = X(\ell, dt)$.

5.4. Verification of the Improved Routing Protocol

The revised versions of the processes of Figure 5, which exploit sequence numbers to trace the freshness of routes and hop counts to choose the shortest paths, are specified in Figures 7 and 8.

Then the linear format of these specifications are given in Figures 9 and 10 (see [14] for explanations how the linear formats are derived). In each summand of the LPEs (and LCNEs later), we only present the parameters whose values are changed: d/x denotes that the parameter x is assigned the data term d . Moreover, b and $\neg b$ denote $eq(b, T)$ and $eq(b, F)$ respectively. In

Figure 7: The revised specifications of the middle process.

$$\begin{aligned}
& Mid(nx : Loc, hp : Nat, sq : Nat, adr : Loc) \stackrel{def}{=} \\
& [\neg(eq(nx, ?))](\\
& \quad \sum_{lx:Loc} rcv(data(lx)).[eq(lx, adr)] \\
& \quad \quad snd(data(nx)).Mid(nx, hp, sq, adr) \\
& \quad \quad \diamond Mid(nx, hp, sq, adr) + \\
& \quad \sum_{lx:Loc} rcv(error(lx)). \\
& \quad \quad [eq(lx, nx)]snd(error(adr)).RtDy(sq + 1, adr, ?) \\
& \quad \quad \quad \diamond Mid(nx, hp, sq, adr) + \\
& \quad \quad snd(error(adr)).RtDy(sq + 1, adr, ?) + \\
& \quad \sum_{lx:Loc} \sum_{sx:Nat} rcv(req(lx, sx)). \\
& \quad \quad [sq \geq sx]snd(rep(adr, lx, sq, hp)).Mid(nx, hp, sq, adr) \\
& \quad \quad \quad \diamond RtDy(sx, adr, lx)) \\
& \diamond (RtDy(sq, adr, ?) + \\
& \quad \sum_{lx:Loc} \sum_{sx:Nat} rcv(req(lx, sx)).RtDy(\max(sx, sq), adr, lx)) \\
& RtDy(sq : Nat, adr : Loc, src : Loc) \stackrel{def}{=} \\
& \quad snd(req(adr, sq)). \\
& \quad (\sum_{lx:Loc} \sum_{ly:Loc} \sum_{sx:Nat} \sum_{hpx:Nat} rcv(rep(lx, ly, sqx, hpx)).(\\
& \quad \quad [eq(ly, adr) \wedge sx \geq sq] \\
& \quad \quad \quad ([\neg eq(src, ?)]snd(rep(adr, src, sqx, hpx + 1)).Mid(lx, hpx + 1, sqx, adr) \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad \diamond Mid(lx, hpx + 1, sqx, adr)) \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad \diamond RtDy(sq, adr, src)) \\
& \quad + RtDy(sq, adr, src)
\end{aligned}$$

Figure 8: The revised specification of destination process.

$$\begin{aligned}
& Dst(sq : Nat, adr : Loc) \stackrel{def}{=} \\
& \quad \sum_{lx:Loc} \sum_{sx:Nat} rcv(req(lx, sx)). \\
& \quad \quad snd(rep(adr, lx, \max(sqx, sq), 0)).Dst(\max(sqx, sq), adr) \\
& \quad \sum_{lx:Loc} rcv(data(lx)).[eq(lx, adr)]0 \diamond Dst(sq, adr).
\end{aligned}$$

these specifications, all request and reply messages carry the sequence number of the path they request for or reply to, while reply messages also carry the hop count of the path. When a process broadcasts the message *error* to inform its neighbors that it cannot be used as a router, it increments its sequence number, which will be used later in the route discovery process. Therefore, a node that has not received an error message on a route for a destination, cannot reply to a request message, since its sequence number is less than the sequence number of the request message. The *dih* parameter in process *Mid* is introduced during the linearization process to indicate when data is hold by the node.

Figure 9: The linearized equations of the initiator and destination processes.

$$\begin{aligned}
Init(s : Nat, adr, dst : Loc) &\stackrel{def}{=} \\
&\sum_{lx:Loc} [eq(s, 0) \wedge \neg eq(lx, ?) \wedge \neg eq(lx, adr) \wedge \neg eq(lx, dst)] \\
&\quad snd(data(lx)).Init(1/s) \diamond 0 \\
\\
Dst(s : Nat, src : Loc, sq : Nat, adr : Loc) &\stackrel{def}{=} \\
&\sum_{lx:Loc} \sum_{sx:Nat} [eq(s, 0)]rcv(req(lx, sx)). \\
&\quad Dst(1/s, \max(sx, sq)/sq, lx/src) \diamond 0 + \\
&\quad [eq(s, 1)]snd(rep(adr, src, sq, 0)).Dst(0/s) \diamond 0 + \\
&\quad \sum_{lx:Loc} [eq(s, 0)]rcv(data(lx)).Dst(if(eq(lx, adr), 2, s)/s) \diamond 0.
\end{aligned}$$

The desired external behavior of a MANET running the routing protocol is given by the process *Routing* in Figure 11. The intuition behind this specification is: when data is held by a middle node ($n \geq 1$) and there is no routing loop on its route to the destination, the distance that the data message should pass to reach the destination, specified by n , is at most N , where N is the number of middle nodes. However, when there is a movement or an error among the nodes including the next node on the route (and the next hop is not the destination, i.e. $n > 1$), the route and consequently the distance to pass may change. This change is specified by arbitrary changes of n to a value less than N (since the middle node holding the data would not participate in the route discovery of its next hop, the number of middle nodes participating in the route discovery is at most $N - 1$). For a network with only the known address B , the data message begins its journey from some initiator (that itself does not know any route to the destination) with $n = 0$, until it reaches the destination B , in the mean time moving between

Figure 10: The linearized equation of the middle process.

$$\begin{aligned}
& Mid(s : Nat, nx, src : Loc, sq, hp : Nat, adr : Loc, dih : Bool) \stackrel{def}{=} \\
& [dih]snd(data(nx)).Mid(F/dih) \diamond 0 + \\
& \sum_{lx:Loc} [eq(s, 0) \wedge \neg eq(nx, ?) \wedge \neg dih] \\
& \quad rcv(data(lx)).Mid(if(eq(lx, adr), T, dih)/dih) \diamond 0 + \\
& [(eq(s, 0) \wedge eq(nx, ?)) \vee s \geq 3] \\
& \quad snd(req(adr, sq)).Mid(4/s, if(eq(s, 0), ?, src)/src) \diamond 0 + \\
& \sum_{lx:Loc} \sum_{sx:Nat} [\neg dih \wedge eq(s, 0)] rcv(req(lx, sx)). \\
& \quad Mid(if(sx > sq \vee eq(nx, ?), 3, 2)/s, lx/src, \max(sq, sx)/sq) \diamond 0 + \\
& [eq(s, 2)]snd(rep(adr, src, sq, hp)).Mid(0/s) \diamond 0 + \\
& \sum_{lx:Loc} \sum_{dx:Loc} \sum_{sx:Nat} \sum_{hx:Nat} [eq(s, 4)] \\
& \quad rcv(rep(lx, dx, sx, hx)). \\
& \quad Mid(if(eq(dx, adr) \wedge sx \geq sq, if(\neg eq(src, ?), 2, 0), s)/s, \\
& \quad if(eq(dx, adr) \wedge sx \geq sq, lx, nx)/nx, \\
& \quad if(eq(dx, adr) \wedge sx \geq sq, sx, sq)/sq, \\
& \quad if(eq(dx, adr) \wedge sx \geq sq, (hx + 1), hp)/hp) \diamond 0 + \\
& [eq(s, 1) \vee (\neg dih \wedge eq(s, 0) \wedge \neg eq(nx, ?))]snd(error(adr)). \\
& \quad Mid(3/s, ?/src, (sq + 1)/sq) \diamond 0 + \\
& \sum_{lx:Loc} [\neg dih \wedge eq(s, 0) \wedge \neg eq(nx, ?)] \\
& \quad rcv(error(lx)).Mid(if(eq(lx, nx), 1, s)/s) \diamond 0
\end{aligned}$$

Figure 11: The desired external behavior.

$$\begin{aligned}
& Routing(n, N : Nat, fin : Bool) \stackrel{def}{=} \\
& [(\neg fin \wedge n > 1) \vee eq(n, 0)] \\
& \quad (\{\}, nsnd(data(?), ?)).Routing(T/fin) \diamond 0 + \\
& \sum_{h:Nat} [(\neg fin \wedge n > 1 \wedge h < N) \vee (eq(n, 0) \wedge h \leq N)] \\
& \quad (\{\}, nsnd(data(?), ?)).Routing(h/n) \diamond 0 + \\
& [\neg fin \wedge eq(n, 1)](\{\}, nsnd(data(B), ?)).Routing(T/fin) \diamond 0
\end{aligned}$$

(middle nodes with) unknown addresses. If a next hop loses the data or the destination receives the data, there is no further data message. The boolean variable fin is false as long as the initiator or a middle node holds the data. In any state, either the data is safely transferred to the next hop (while the distance of the next hop may change in case the next hop is not the destination), or the next hop may lose it (and consequently fin is updated to true). Due to arbitrary mobility of nodes, always a route is found from any middle node to the destination. Therefore, the desired external behavior specifies that data always reaches its destination, unless it is lost on the way.

We are going to prove that the parallel composition of a node with the initiator process, a finite number of nodes deploying the middle process, specified by $nMid$ using equation 2, and a node with the destination process, behaves like *Routing*:

$$nMid(\ell : LocList, \xi t : \Xi Table) \stackrel{def}{=} [eq(\ell, \emptyset)]_0 \diamond ([Mid(\xi t[\ell[0]])]_{\ell[0]} \parallel nMid(\ell \setminus \ell[0], \xi t))$$

where $nodup(\ell)$, $\Xi : Nat \times Loc^2 \times Nat^2 \times Loc \times Bool$, and $\Xi Table$ is a table containing elements of sort Ξ . Let $\xi \in \Xi$ represent the sequence $\langle s, nx, src, hp, sq, adr, dih \rangle$. $get_{dih}(\ell, \xi t)$ returns the dih element of the entry with index ℓ in the table $\xi t : \Xi Table$, and $upd_{dih}(\ell, b, \xi t)$ updates such an element. We use dih_i or $\xi t[i].dih$ to denote $get_{dih}(i, \xi t)$. Our goal is to derive the following equation (Theorem 2):

$$(\{\}, \tau).Routing(0, |\ell|, F) = (\{\}, \tau).\tau_{\widetilde{M}_2}(\partial_{\widetilde{M}_1}((\nu A) \parallel [Init(0, A, B)]_A \parallel (\nu \ell)nMid(\ell, \xi t) \parallel [Dst(0, ?, 0, B)]_B)) \quad (4)$$

where $\widetilde{M}_1 = \{req, rep, error, data\}$, $\widetilde{M}_2 = \{req, rep, error\}$, $(\nu \ell)$ abbreviates $(\nu \ell_1) \dots (\nu \ell_n)$ for all $\ell_1, \dots, \ell_n \in \ell$, $A, B \notin \ell$, and for all $i \leq |\ell|$, the i^{th} entry of table ξt is $\langle 0, ?, ?, 0, 0, i, F \rangle$. The initial τ actions specify the initial route discoveries of middle nodes. To prove equation 4 regarding Lemma 2, we exploit the symbolic verification technique to show that:

$$Routing(0, |\ell|, fin) \simeq_b \tau_{\widetilde{M}_2}(InitnMidDst(0, \ell, \xi t, 0, ?, 0))$$

where

$$InitnMidDst(s_A : Nat, \ell : LocList, \xi t : \Xi Table, s_B : Nat, src_B : Loc, sq_B : Loc) \stackrel{def}{=} \sum_{lx:Loc} \sum_{ls:LocList} [eq(s_A, 0) \wedge ls \subseteq \ell \wedge \bigwedge_{i \in ls} (eq(s_i, 0) \wedge \neg eq(nx_i, ?) \wedge \neg dih_i)] \quad (1)$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& (\{\}, nsnd(data(?), ?)).InitnMidDst(1/s_A, \forall_{i \in ls} if(eq(lx, i), T, dih_i)/dih_i) \diamond 0 + \\
& \sum_{k:Loc\ ls:LocList} \sum [k \in \ell \wedge ls \subseteq (B \triangleright \ell \setminus k) \wedge dih_k \tag{2}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \bigwedge_{i \in ls \setminus B} (eq(s_i, 0) \wedge \neg eq(nx_i, ?) \wedge \neg dih_i \wedge (B \in ls \Rightarrow eq(s_B, 0))) \\
& (if(B \in ls, \{? \rightsquigarrow B\}, \{\}), nsnd(data(if(eq(nx_k, B), B, ?), ?)). \\
& \quad InitnMidDst(F/dih_k, \forall_{i \in ls \setminus B} if(eq(nx_k, i), T, dih_i)/dih_i, \\
& \quad if(B \in ls \wedge eq(nx_k, B), 2, s_B)/s_B) \diamond 0 + \\
& \sum_{k:Loc\ ls:LocList} \sum [k \in \ell \wedge ls \subseteq (B \triangleright \ell \setminus k) \wedge ((eq(s_k, 0) \wedge eq(nx_k, ?)) \tag{3}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\vee s_k \geq 3) \bigwedge_{i \in ls \setminus B} (\neg dih_i \wedge eq(s_i, 0) \wedge (B \in ls \Rightarrow eq(s_B, 0)))$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& (if(B \in ls, \{? \rightsquigarrow B\}, \{\}), nsnd(req(?), sq_k, ?)). \\
& \quad InitnMidDst(4/s_k, if(eq(s_k, 0), ?, src_k)/src_k, \forall_{i \in ls \setminus B} (\\
& \quad if(sq_k > sq_i \vee eq(nx_i, ?), 3, 2)/s_i, k/src_i, \max(sq_i, sq_k)/sq_i, \\
& \quad if(B \in ls, 1, s_B)/s_B, if(B \in ls, \max(sq_k, sq_B), sq_B)/sq_B, \\
& \quad if(B \in ls, k, src_B/src_B)) \diamond 0 +
\end{aligned}$$

$$\sum_{k:Loc\ ls:LocList} \sum [k \in \ell \wedge ls \subseteq (\ell \setminus k) \wedge eq(s_k, 2) \bigwedge_{i \in ls \setminus B} eq(s_i, 4)] \tag{4}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& (\{\}, nsnd(rep(?), ?, sq_k, hp_k, ?)).InitnMidDst(0/s_k, (\\
& \quad \forall_{i \in ls} if(eq(src_k, i) \wedge sq_k \geq sq_i, if(\neg eq(src_i, ?), 2, 0), s_i)/s_i, \\
& \quad if(eq(src_k, i) \wedge sq_k \geq sq_i, k, nx_i)/nx_i, \\
& \quad if(eq(src_k, i) \wedge sq_k \geq sq_i, sq_k, sq_i)/sq_i, \\
& \quad if(eq(src_k, i) \wedge sq_k \geq sq_i, hp_k + 1, hp_i)/hp_i)) \diamond 0 +
\end{aligned}$$

$$\sum_{ls:LocList} [eq(s_B, 1) \wedge ls \subseteq \ell \wedge \neg eq(ls, \emptyset) \bigwedge_{i \in ls} eq(s_i, 4)] \tag{5}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& (\{\}, nsnd(rep(B, ?, sq_B, 0), B)).InitnMidDst((\\
& \quad \forall_{i \in ls} if(eq(src_B, i) \wedge sq_B \geq sq_i, if(\neg eq(src_i, ?), 2, 0), s_i)/s_i, \\
& \quad if(eq(src_B, i) \wedge sq_B \geq sq_i, B, nx_i)/nx_i, \\
& \quad if(eq(src_B, i) \wedge sq_B \geq sq_i, sq_B, sq_i)/sq_i, \\
& \quad if(eq(src_B, i) \wedge sq_B \geq sq_i, 0, hp_i)/hp_i, 0/s_B) \diamond 0 +
\end{aligned}$$

$$\sum_{k:Loc\ ls:LocList} \sum [k \in \ell \wedge ls \subseteq (\ell \setminus k) \wedge (eq(s_k, 1) \tag{6}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \forall (\neg dih_k \wedge eq(s_k, 0) \wedge \neg eq(nx_k, ?)) \bigwedge_{i \in ls} (\neg dih_i \wedge eq(s_i, 0) \wedge \neg eq(nx_i, ?)) \\
& (\{\}, nsnd(error(?), ?)).InitnMidDst(3/s_k, ?/src_k, (sq_k + 1)/sq_k, \\
& \quad \forall_{i \in ls} if(eq(k, nx_i), 1, s_i)/s_i) \diamond 0
\end{aligned}$$

where $\bigwedge_{i \in \ell_s}$ examines a boolean expression on, and $\forall_{i \in \ell_s}$ updates, a set of entries, implemented like the functions $and_all_{h_m, f_m, f'_m}$ and $upd_all_{g_m}$, respectively. For instance, $\bigwedge_{i \in ls} eq(s_i, 4)$ and $\forall_{i \in ls} if(eq(k, nx_i), 1, s_i)/s_i$ are equal to $and_all(ls, \xi t)$ and $upd_all(ls, k, \xi t)$ respectively, where:

$$\begin{aligned}
and_all(\emptyset, \xi t) &= T \\
and_all(\ell \triangleright ll, \xi t) &= eq(\xi t[\ell].s, 4) \wedge and_all(ll, \xi t) \\
upd_all(\emptyset, \ell', \xi t) &= empT \\
upd_all(\ell \triangleright ll, \ell', \xi t) &= upd_s(\ell, if(eq(\ell', \xi t[\ell].nx), 1, \xi t[\ell].s), upd_all(ll, \ell', \xi t)).
\end{aligned}$$

Lemma 2.

$$\begin{aligned}
& InitnMidDst(s_A, \ell, \xi t, s_B, src_B, sq_B) = \\
& \quad \partial_{\widetilde{M}_1}((\nu A)[[Init(s_A, A, B)]_A \parallel (\nu ll)nMid(\ell, \xi t) \parallel [[Dst(s_B, src_B, sq_B, B)]_B]).
\end{aligned}$$

Proof. We first expand $nMid(\ell, \xi t)$ by application of Composition Theorem 1 (see [14]), and then $\partial_{\widetilde{M}_1}((\nu A)[[Init(s_A, A, B)]_A \parallel (\nu ll)nMid(\ell, \xi t) \parallel [[Dst(s_B, src_B, sq_B, B)]_B])$ by application of parallel, hiding, and encapsulation and LA_{1-13} axioms. We conclude the proof by application of *Fold*. \square

We introduce the state mapping $\phi : Nat \times LocList \times \Xi Table \times Nat \times Loc \times Nat \rightarrow Nat^2 \times Bool$, where $\phi(s_A, \ell, \xi t, s_B, src_B, sq_B) = (n, N, fn)$ is defined:

$$\begin{aligned}
n &= if(\neg fn, if(eq(s_A, 0), 0, \exists_{i \in \ell} \cdot dih_i \Rightarrow hp_i), \text{any value}) \\
N &= |\ell| \\
fn &= \bigwedge_{i \in \ell} \neg dih_i \wedge eq(s_A, 1)
\end{aligned}$$

As long as data is held by some node in the network ($\neg fn$), the value of 0 for n denotes that the data is held by the initiator (that does not know any route to the destination) while the value $n \geq 1$ denotes that the data is held by a middle node and so this value specifies the distance that data message should pass to reach the destination. Therefore, when data is not held by the initiator ($\neg eq(s_A, 0)$), its value is the hop count of middle node holding the data. The maximum distance that the data message can pass equals the number of middle nodes. Since fn implies no further data transmission, it

becomes true if the middle nodes and the initiator do not have the data. The values of s_B , src_B and sq_B do not affect ϕ , so we write $\phi(s_A, \ell, \xi t)$ instead of $\phi(s_A, \ell, \xi t, s_B, src_B, sq_B)$.

Invariants of $InitnMidDst(s_A, \ell, \xi t, s_B, src_B, sq_B)$ are:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{I}_1 &\equiv eq(s_i, 0) \vee eq(s_i, 1) \vee eq(s_i, 2) \vee eq(s_i, 3) \vee eq(s_i, 4) \vee eq(s_i, 5) \\
\mathcal{I}_2 &\equiv (eq(s_B, 0) \vee eq(s_B, 1) \vee eq(s_B, 2)) \wedge (eq(s_A, 0) \vee eq(s_A, 1)) \\
\mathcal{I}_3 &\equiv eq(nx_i, j) \vee eq(nx_i, ?) \\
\mathcal{I}_4 &\equiv dih_i \Rightarrow eq(s_A, 1) \wedge \forall_{k \in \ell \wedge \neg eq(k, i)} \neg dih_k \\
\mathcal{I}_5 &\equiv dih_i \Rightarrow eq(s_i, 0) \wedge \neg eq(nx_i, ?) \\
\mathcal{I}_6 &\equiv eq(nx_i, j) \wedge eq(s_j, 0) \Rightarrow \neg eq(nx_j, ?) \\
\mathcal{I}_7 &\equiv eq(nx_i, j) \wedge s_i \leq 2 \Rightarrow sq_j \geq sq_i \wedge hp_i > 0 \\
\mathcal{I}_8 &\equiv eq(nx_i, j) \wedge eq(sq_i, sq_j) \wedge s_i \leq 2 \Rightarrow eq(hp_i, hp_j + 1) \\
\mathcal{I}_9 &\equiv eq(nx_i, B) \Leftrightarrow eq(hp_i, 1) \wedge sq_B \geq sq_i \\
\mathcal{I}_{10} &\equiv eq(s_i, 3) \vee eq(s_i, 4) \Leftrightarrow eq(nx_i, ?) \\
\mathcal{I}_{11} &\equiv s_i \leq 2 \Rightarrow \neg eq(src_i, ?)
\end{aligned}$$

where $i, j \in \ell$ such that $\neg eq(i, j)$.

Invariants \mathcal{I}_{1-3} define the ranges of variables. Intuitively \mathcal{I}_4 explains that only one middle node or the initiator can hold the data, and \mathcal{I}_5 explains this is when that node has a route to the destination ($\neg eq(nx, ?)$) and stays in the state 0. Each next hop always has a route unless it is involved in another route discovery (when $\neg eq(s_j, 0)$), as stated by \mathcal{I}_6 . Invariants $\mathcal{I}_{7,8}$ imply that on a route from a middle node to the destination, either the sequence numbers increase, or the sequence numbers are equal (denoting to a stable route) and the hop counts decrease. When a middle node is directed connected to the destination, its hop count is 1, as explained by \mathcal{I}_9 . The existence of a route in the node i is inferred by the condition $s_i \leq 2$, as implied by \mathcal{I}_{10} . By \mathcal{I}_{11} , a node may send a reply to a node with address src_i if it is involved in a route discovery.

Lemma 3. \mathcal{I}_{1-11} are invariants of $InitnMidDst(s_A, \ell, \xi t, s_B, src_B, sq_B)$.

Proof. We only prove invariants \mathcal{I}_7 and \mathcal{I}_8 together; the others can be proved with a similar argumentation. We start from a state with $eq(s_i, 0) \wedge eq(s_j, 0) \wedge eq(nx_i, j) \wedge eq(sq_i, sq_j) \wedge eq(hp_i + 1, hp_j) \wedge eq(nx_j, k) \wedge \neg eq(i, k)$. According to the values of dih_i and dih_j , three cases can be considered. We examine the

activities of node i and j in these states, to trace how sq_i, sq_j and hp_i, hp_j are changed. We use x' to denote the updated value of x in the next state:

- dih_i : In this state, according to \mathcal{I}_4 , $\neg dih_j$. By summand 2, node i may send a data message, and two cases can be distinguished. If $j \in ls$, a state with $\neg dih'_i \wedge dih'_j$ is reached, otherwise a state with $\neg dih'_i$ is reached. Both cases are examined later. By summand 6, node j may send an error while $i \notin ls$ (since dih_i), and a state with $eq(s'_j, 3) \wedge sq'_j = sq_j + 1$ is reached. From this state, only states with $eq(nx_i, j) \wedge sq_j > sq_i \wedge dih_i$ are reached, unless node i sends data which is examined later. By summand 6, node j may receive an error message from any node other than i and a state with $eq(s'_j, 1)$. Again from this state, node j may send an error message, and a state with $eq(s'_j, 3) \wedge sq'_j = sq_j + 1$ is reached as discussed before. By summand 3, node j may receive a request from any node other than i . Depending on the value of the carried sequence number, a state with $eq(s'_j, 2)$ or $eq(s'_j, 3)$ is reached. In the former case, node j can only send a reply message by summand 4, and then a state with $eq(s'_j, 0)$ is reached again. In the latter case, a state with $eq(s'_j, 3) \wedge sq'_j = sq_j + 1$ is reached as discussed before.
- dih_j : In this state, according to \mathcal{I}_4 , it holds that $\neg dih_i$. By summand 2, node j may send a data message, and only a state with $\neg dih_i \wedge \neg dih_j$ is reached (which is discussed later). By summand 6, node i may send an error while $j \notin ls$ (since dih_j), and a state with $eq(s'_i, 3) \wedge sq'_i = sq_i + 1$ is reached. From this state, only states with $eq(s_i, 0) \wedge \neg eq(nx_i, j)$ are reached, unless node j sends data which is examined later. By summand 6, node i may receive an error, but since it was from a node other than j , its state is not changed. By summand 3, node i may receive a request from any node other than j . Depending on the value of carried sequence number, a state with $eq(s'_i, 2)$ or $eq(s'_i, 3)$ is reached. In the former case, node i can only send a reply message by summand 4, and then a state with $eq(s'_i, 0)$ is reached again. In the latter case, a state with $eq(s'_i, 3) \wedge sq'_i = sq_i + 1$ is reached, as discussed before.
- $\neg dih_i \wedge \neg dih_j$: By summands 3, 6, 2 and 1, the following cases need to be considered:
 - By summand 3, node i may receive a request from any node other than j (since $\neg eq(nx_j, ?)$), and depending on the value of its carried sequence number, a state with $eq(s'_i, 2)$ or $eq(s'_i, 3) \wedge sq'_i =$

$sq_i + 1$ is reached. In the former case, node i can only send a reply message, and again a state with $eq(s'_i, 0)$ is reached. In the latter case, by summand 3, node i may send a request, and a state with $eq(s'_i, 4)$ is reached, while depending on $j \in ls$, node j may receive such a request. If node j receives such a request, then $eq(s'_j, 3) \wedge eq(src'_j, i) \wedge sq'_j = sq_j + 1$ holds. From this state, j may find a path to the destination, and reply to i , so by summand 4, a state with $eq(s_i, 0) \wedge eq(nx_i, j) \wedge eq(sq_i, sq_j) \wedge eq(hp_i, hp_j + 1)$ can be reached. However if a node other than j replies to i , then a state with $eq(s_i, 0) \wedge \neg eq(nx_i, j)$ is reached. If node j does not receive such a request, then node i may send the request again by summand 3 until it receives a reply. If j never receives these requests, then states with $eq(s_i, 0) \wedge \neg eq(nx_i, j)$ are reached, but if j receives one of these requests of i , then a state with $eq(s'_j, 3) \wedge eq(src'_j, i) \wedge sq'_j = sq_j + 1$ is reached, as already discussed.

- By summand 3, node j may receive a request from any node other than i (since $\neg eq(nx_i, ?)$). With a similar argumentation as in the previous case, suppose that a state with $eq(s'_j, 3) \wedge sq'_j = sq_j + 1 \wedge \neg eq(src'_j, i)$ is reached. From this state two sets of states can be reached. Either node i may not send or receive any request with a higher sequence number than its own, and consequently only states with $eq(s_i, 0) \wedge eq(nx_i, j) \wedge sq_j > sq_i$ can be reached. Or node i may send or receive a request with a higher sequence number, in which case states with $eq(s_i, 0) \wedge \neg eq(nx_i, j)$ can be reached (since $\neg eq(src'_j, i)$).
- By summand 3, both nodes i, j may receive a request from a node k , and depending on the carried sequence number, the next states of both are 2 or 3. The first case is straightforward, as discussed in the previous cases. In the second case, a state with $eq(s'_l, 3) \wedge eq(src'_l, k) \wedge sq'_l = sq_l + 1$ where $l \in \{i, j\}$ is reached. From this state, only states with $eq(s_i, 0) \wedge \neg eq(nx_i, j)$ can be reached.
- By summand 6, node j may send an error message, and depending on $i \in ls$, node i may receive. If node i does not receive it, then a state with $eq(s'_j, 3) \wedge sq'_j = sq_j + 1 \wedge eq(src'_j, ?)$ is reached. From this state two sets of states can be reached. Either node i may not send

or receive any request with a higher sequence number than its own, and consequently only states with $eq(s_i, 0) \wedge eq(nx_i, j) \wedge sq_j > sq_i$ can be reached. Or node i may send or receive a request with a higher sequence number, in which case states with $eq(s_i, 0) \wedge \neg eq(nx_i, j)$ can be reached (since $eq(src'_j, ?)$). If node i receives the error, a state with $eq(s'_j, 3) \wedge sq'_j = sq_j + 1 \wedge eq(src'_j, ?) \wedge eq(s'_i, 1)$ is reached. From this state, only states with $eq(s_i, 0) \wedge \neg eq(nx_i, j)$ can be reached (since $eq(src'_j, ?)$).

- By summand 6, node i may send an error message, and no matter whether j receives it or not, a state with $eq(s'_i, 3) \wedge sq'_i = sq_i + 1$ is reached. By summand 3, node i may send a request, and as discussed before, depending on whether j may receive such requests and then sends a reply to i , two sets of states can be reached: either $eq(s_i, 0) \wedge eq(nx_i, j) \wedge eq(sq_i, sq_i) \wedge eq(hp_i, hp_j + 1)$ or $eq(s_i, 0) \wedge \neg eq(nx_i, j)$.
- By summand 6, node i, j may receive an error from a node l . Depending on nx_l , one of the nodes i, j would receive it, and a state with $eq(nx'_i, 2)$ or $eq(nx'_j, 2)$ is reached. In any of these state, node i or j may send an error, which was discussed before.
- By summands 2 and 1, node i, j may receive data from a node l where dih_l . Depending on nx_l , one of the nodes i, j may receive it, and a state with $\neg dih'_i \wedge dih'_i$ or $\neg dih'_j \wedge dih'_j$ is reached, as discussed before.

□

Lemma 4. For all $s_A, \ell : LocList$ with $nodup(\ell)$, $\xi t, s_B, src_B, sq_B$ and $A, B \notin \ell$ such that the invariants of \mathcal{I}_{1-11} are satisfied, then

$$\tau_{\widetilde{M}_2}(InitnMidDst(s_A, \ell, \xi t, s_B, src_B, sq_B)) \simeq_b Routing(\phi(s_A, \ell, \xi t)).$$

Proof. According to Proposition 1, the following conditions should be examined. Let $\eta_\tau \in I_{\widetilde{M}_1}$ where $I_{\widetilde{M}_1} = \{nsnd(\mathcal{C}, \mathbf{m}, \ell), nrcv(\mathcal{C}, \mathbf{m}) \mid \exists m \in \widetilde{M}_1 \cdot isType_m(\mathbf{m})\}$. We use x' to denote the updated value of x in the next state.

1. Two cases need to be considered for the states of *InitnMidDst*: the data is held by node A , i.e. $eq(s_A, 0)$, or by a middle node $i \in \ell$ (since if no node holds the data, no η_τ action can make dih_j for some node j or $eq(s_A, 0)$, and consequently the mapped state, i.e. $\neg fin$, would

not change). If $eq(s_A, 0)$, then the mapped state is $eq(n, 0)$ and no η_τ action can change s_A . If dih_i , then the mapped state is $eq(n, hp_i)$, while $\neg fin \wedge eq(N, |\ell|)$. The hp_i may change if node i receives a *rep* message by summand 4 or 5 (when $eq(s_i, 4)$). But by invariant \mathcal{I}_5 and dih_i , $eq(s_i, 0)$ holds and so it cannot receive such a message. Since an η_τ by another node would not change hp_i and dih_i , the mapped state is not changed by any η_τ .

2. Only communications of *InitnMidDst* over messages *data* are visible, which are only possible when dih_i for some node $i \in \ell$ or $eq(s_A, 0)$. Therefore three classes of states can be considered.

- $eq(s_A, 0)$: By invariant \mathcal{I}_4 , $\bigwedge_{i \in \ell} \neg dih_i$ holds. In these states, for any arbitrary $lx : Loc$ and $ls : LocList$, *InitnMidDst* performs $nsnd(data(?), ?)$ for all possible topologies $\{\}$ by summand 1, while node lx may receive or may not receive such data (depending on $lx \in ls \wedge eq(s_{lx}, 0) \wedge \neg eq(nx_{lx}, ?)$). If node lx does not receive such data, a state with $eq(s'_A, 1) \bigwedge_{i \in \ell} \neg dih_i$ is reached, and this scenario is matched with a same action and network constraint of *Routing* which makes $eq(fin', F)$. If node lx receives this message, a state with dih'_{lx} is reached. This scenario can be matched with a same action and network constraint of *Routing*, by which $eq(n', hp_{lx})$.
- $dih_i \wedge eq(nx_i, j) \wedge hp_i > 1$: By invariant \mathcal{I}_4 , $eq(s_A, 1) \bigwedge_{j \in \ell, \neg eq(i,j)} \neg dih_j$ holds. In these states, for any arbitrary $ls : LocList$, *InitnMidDst* performs $nsnd(data(?), ?)$ by summand 2 with the network constraint $\{? \rightsquigarrow B\}$ or $\{\}$ depending on $B \in ls$, while node j may receive or may not receive such data (depending on $j \in ls \wedge eq(s_j, 0) \wedge \neg eq(nx_j, ?)$). If node j does not receive such a message, a state with $\neg dih'_i \wedge eq(s_A, 1) \bigwedge_{j \in \ell, \neg eq(i,j)} \neg dih_j$ is reached, and this scenario is matched by the sending data action of *Routing* with the network constraint $\{\}$ which makes $eq(fin', F)$. If the next hop (node j) receives, then this scenario can be matched by the sending data action of *Routing* with the network constraint $\{\}$, by which $eq(n', hp_j)$.
- $dih_i \wedge eq(nx_i, j) \wedge eq(hp_i, 1)$: By invariant \mathcal{I}_9 , $eq(j, B)$, and by invariant \mathcal{I}_4 , $eq(s_A, 1) \bigwedge_{j \in \ell, \neg eq(i,j)} \neg dih_j$. In these states, for any arbitrary $ls : LocList$, *InitnMidDst* performs $nsnd(data(B), ?)$ by summand 2 with the network constraint $\{? \rightsquigarrow B\}$ or $\{\}$ depending on $B \in ls$, and a state with $\neg dih'_i \wedge eq(s_A, 1) \bigwedge_{j \in \ell, \neg eq(i,j)} \neg dih_j$ is

reached. This scenario is matched by a sending data action of *Routing* with the network constraint $\{\}$ which makes $eq(fin', F)$.

3. Four cases can be considered for $\phi(s_A, \ell, \xi t)$, i.e. the states of *Routing*:

- fin : In this case no action can be performed. The same holds for *InitnMidDst*, since the mapping state is $\bigwedge_{i \in \ell} \neg dih_i \wedge eq(s_A, 1)$, and by summands 2 and 1, data can be sent when $eq(s_A, 0)$ or dih_i for some $i \in \ell$;
- $eq(n, 0)$: In this case *Routing* can make two $(\{\}, nsnd(data(?), ?))$ transitions, either to a state with $\neg fin'$, or for some $h < N$ to a state $eq(n', h)$. This state is mapped from states of *InitnMidDst* with $eq(s_A, 0)$. The first transition of *Routing* can be matched by the transitions of summand 1 such that the data sent by node A is not received by node lx ($lx \notin ls \vee (\neg eq(s_{lx}, 0) \vee eq(nx_{lx}, ?))$). By invariants $\mathcal{I}_{7,8}$ the hop count of each middle node is at most the number of middle nodes participating in the route discovery. Therefore, for any value of h , this state can do some η_τ actions, due to arbitrary mobility of nodes, such that for some address $lx \in \ell$, $\neg eq(nx'_i, ?) \wedge eq(s'_i, 0) \wedge eq(hp'_i, h)$ holds, while the data is still held by s_A . Then this state can perform a sending data action with the network constraint $\{\}$ by summand 1 for $eq(lx, i) \wedge i \in ls$ such that a state with dih'_{lx} is reached. The second transition of *Routing* is matched to these data transitions.
- $n > 1 \wedge \neg fin$: Similar to the previous case, *Routing* can make two $(\{\}, nsnd(data(?), ?))$ transitions, either to a state with $\neg fin'$, or for some $h < N$ to a state with $eq(n', h)$. This state is mapped from states of *InitnMidDst* with $dih_i \wedge eq(hp_i, n) \wedge eq(nx_i, j)$ for some arbitrary address $j \in \ell \wedge n > 0$. The first transition of *Routing* can be matched by the transitions of summand 2 such that the data sent by node i is not received by node j ($j \notin ls \vee (\neg eq(s_j, 0) \vee eq(nx_j, ?))$). By invariants $\mathcal{I}_{7,8}$ the hop count of each middle node is less than the number of middle nodes participating in the route discovery. Therefore, for any value of h , this state can do some η_τ actions, due to the arbitrary mobility changes of nodes, such a state with $\neg eq(nx'_j, ?) \wedge eq(s'_j, 0) \wedge eq(hp'_j, h)$ is reached, while the data is still held by i . Then this state can perform a sending data action with the network constraint $\{\}$ by summand 2 for arbitrary ls such that $j \in ls$ and a state with dih'_j

is reached. The second transition of *Routing* is matched to this data transition.

- $\neg \text{fin} \wedge n = 1$: In this case, *Routing* can perform $(\{\}, \text{nsnd}(\text{data}(B), ?))$, by which *fin* is set to *F*. By invariant \mathcal{I}_9 , the state of *InitnMidDst* implies that $\text{eq}(\text{dih}_i, T) \wedge \text{eq}(\text{hp}_i, 1) \wedge \text{eq}(\text{nx}_i, B)$ for some node *i*. By summand 2, *InitnMidDst* can perform $\text{nsnd}(\text{data}(B), ?)$ for some *ls* : *LocList* such that $B \notin \text{ls}$, while the value of *dih_i* is set to false.

□

Corollary 1. *For all $s_A : \text{Nat}$, $\ell : \text{LocList}$ with $\text{nodup}(\ell)$, ξt , s_B , src_B , sq_B and $A, B \notin \ell$ such that the invariants of \mathcal{I}_{1-11} are satisfied,*

$$(\{\}, \tau). \text{Routing}(\phi(s_A, \ell, \xi t)) \simeq_{rb} (\{\}, \tau). \tau_{M_2} \widetilde{(\partial_{M_1}((\nu A) \llbracket \text{Init}(s_A, A, B) \rrbracket_A \parallel (\nu \ell) \text{nMid}(\ell, \xi t) \parallel \llbracket \text{Dst}(s_B, \text{src}_B, \text{sq}_B, B) \rrbracket_B))}.$$

Equation 4 is a direct result of following corollary.

Theorem 2. *For all $\ell : \text{LocList}$ with $\text{nodup}(\ell)$, ξt such that for all $i \leq |\ell|$ the i^{th} entry of table ξt holds $\langle 0, ?, ?, 0, 0, i, F \rangle$:*

$$(\{\}, \tau). \text{Routing}(0, |\ell|, F) \simeq_{rb} (\{\}, \tau). \tau_{M_2} \widetilde{(\partial_{M_1}((\nu A) \llbracket \text{Init}(0, A, B) \rrbracket_A \parallel (\nu \ell) \text{nMid}(\ell, \xi t) \parallel \llbracket \text{Dst}(0, ?, 0, B) \rrbracket_B))}.$$

6. Conclusions and Future Work

In this paper, we enhanced and illustrated the applicability of our framework *CNT*, tailored for the specification and verification of MANETs. To this aim, we examined the applicability of the *CNT* operational semantics, constrained labeled transition systems, in model checking. Through model checking we can examine the behavior of a MANET for arbitrary mobility of nodes through one model, without the need to specify mobility changes. The constraints added to the transition labels allow us to derive mobility scenarios for each MANET behavior. Then we extended our framework with symbolic verification technique based on cones and foci, and demonstrated its application to the verification of MANETs with an arbitrary number of nodes which deploy the same protocol. We aim to establish a framework for mechanical protocol verification following the approach of [8]. Our algebraic framework is the first one that addresses the verification of networks with an arbitrary

number of nodes. In [23] an approach using a model checker (*SPIN*) and a theorem prover (*HOL*) was presented to reason about such networks; the theorem prover uses the facts proved by model checker. However, breaking down a proof to these facts is not straightforward. The symbolic verification approach provides a more natural proof framework for such networks.

Our framework is applicable in wireless networks in which communication is based on non-blocking and lossy local broadcast, if it is extended with the static location binding operator of [24] which restricts the arbitrary mobility of nodes.

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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1

We exploit semi-branching computed network bisimilarity introduced in [3] to prove Proposition 1. In the next definition, $t \xrightarrow{[(\mathcal{C}, \eta)]} t'$ denotes either $t \xrightarrow{(\mathcal{C}, \eta)} t'$, or $t = t'$ if η is of the form $nrcv(\mathbf{m})$ or τ .

Remark 1. As axiom Ch_6 explains, if $t \xrightarrow{(\mathcal{C}_1, \eta)} t'$, then $t \xrightarrow{(\mathcal{C}_2, \eta)} t'$ for any $\mathcal{C}_1 \subseteq \mathcal{C}_2$.

Definition 6. A binary relation \mathcal{R} on computed network terms is a semi-branching computed network simulation, if $t_1 \mathcal{R} t_2$ implies whenever $t_1 \xrightarrow{(\mathcal{C}, \eta)} t'_1$:

- there are t'_2 and t''_2 such that $t_2 \Rightarrow t''_2 \xrightarrow{[(\mathcal{C}, \eta)]} t'_2$, $t_1 \mathcal{R} t''_2$ and $t'_1 \mathcal{R} t'_2$.

\mathcal{R} is a semi-branching computed network bisimulation if \mathcal{R} and \mathcal{R}^{-1} are semi-branching computed network simulations. Computed networks t_1 and t_2 are semi-branching computed network bisimilar if $t_1 \mathcal{R} t_2$, for some semi-branching computed network bisimulation relation \mathcal{R} .

Theorem 3. *Two computed network terms are related by a branching computed network bisimulation if and only if they are related by a semi-branching computed network bisimulation [3].*

To prove Proposition 1, in view of Theorem 3, instead of showing that the state mapping relation $\phi : D \rightarrow D'$ constitutes a branching computed network bisimulation, we show that it constitutes a semi-branching computed network bisimulation on the reachable states of D , overapproximated by the invariant \mathcal{I} . We assume without loss of generality that D and D' are disjoint. Define $\mathcal{R} \subseteq D \times D'$ as the smallest relation such that whenever $\mathcal{I}(d)$ for a $d : D$, then $d \mathcal{R} \phi(d)$. Then we show that \mathcal{R} satisfies the transfer conditions of Definition 6. Let $s \mathcal{R} t$ such that $t = \phi(s)$. By definition of \mathcal{R} we have $\mathcal{I}(s)$.

- If $s \xrightarrow{(\mathcal{C}, \eta)} s'$, there are two cases to consider:
 1. If $\eta = \tau$, then it must be generated by application of the abstraction function $\tau_{\widetilde{M}}$ on an action $\eta_\tau \in I_{\widetilde{M}}$, while $h_{\eta_\tau}(s, e)$, $s' = g_{\eta_\tau}(s, e)$ and $\mathcal{C} = \mathcal{C}_{\eta_\tau}(s, e)$ for some $e : E$. By matching criterion 1, $\phi(g_{\eta_\tau}(s, e)) = t$. Moreover, $\mathcal{I}(s)$ and $h_{\eta_\tau}(s, e)$ together imply that $\mathcal{I}(g_{\eta_\tau}(s, e))$. Hence, by definition of \mathcal{R} , $g_{\eta_\tau}(s, e) \mathcal{R} t$.
 2. If $\eta \neq \tau$, then $h_\eta(s, e)$, $s' = g_\eta(s, e)$ and $\mathcal{C} = \mathcal{C}_\eta(s, e)$ for some $\eta \in \text{Act}^c \setminus I_{\widetilde{M}}$ and $e : E$. By matching criterion 2, either η is a receive action such that $\phi(g_\eta(s, e)) = t$, or there is an $\langle \eta \rangle$ such that $h'_{\langle \eta \rangle}(t, e)$, $f_\eta(s, e) = f'_{\langle \eta \rangle}(t, e)$, $\mathcal{C}'_{\langle \eta \rangle}(t, e) \subseteq \mathcal{C}_\eta(s, e)$ and $\phi(g_\eta(s, e)) = g'_{\langle \eta \rangle}(t, e)$. Moreover, $\mathcal{I}(s)$ and $h_\eta(s, e)$ together imply $\mathcal{I}(g_\eta(s, e))$. In the former case, by definition of \mathcal{R} , $g_\eta(s, e) \mathcal{R} t$. In the latter case, by remark 1 and $\langle (\mathcal{C}_\eta(s, e), \eta) \rangle = (\mathcal{C}_{\langle \eta \rangle}(s, e), \langle \eta \rangle)$, $t \xrightarrow{\langle (\mathcal{C}_\eta(s, e), \eta) \rangle} g'_{\langle \eta \rangle}(t, e)$ and consequently $g_\eta(s, e) \mathcal{R} g'_{\langle \eta \rangle}(t, e)$.
- If $t \xrightarrow{\eta}_{\mathcal{C}} t'$, then $h'_\eta(t, e)$, $t' = g'_\eta(t, e)$ and $\mathcal{C} = \mathcal{C}'_\eta(t, e)$ for some $\eta \in \text{Act}^c \setminus I_{\widetilde{M}}$ and $e : E$. By matching criterion 3, either η is a receive action such that $t = t'$, or there is an $s^* : D$ such that $s \xrightarrow{\eta_{\tau_1}}_{\mathcal{C}_1} \dots \xrightarrow{\eta_{\tau_n}}_{\mathcal{C}_n} s^*$ with $\eta_{\tau_1}, \dots, \eta_{\tau_n} \in I_{\widetilde{M}}$ and $h_{\langle \eta \rangle}(s^*, e)$, $f_{\langle \eta \rangle}(s^*, e) = f'_\eta(t, e)$, $\mathcal{C}_{\langle \eta \rangle}(s^*, e) \subseteq$

$\mathcal{C}'_{\eta}(t, e)$ and $\phi(g_{\langle\eta\rangle}(s^*, e)) = g'_{\eta}(t, e)$ in the *CLTS* for *Imp*. Invariant \mathcal{I} and matching criterion 1 hold for all states on this η_{τ} -path. Repeatedly applying matching criterion 1, we get $\phi(s^*) = \phi(s) = t$. The former case is straightforward since $\mathcal{I}(s^*)$, and by definition of \mathcal{R} , $s^* \mathcal{R} t$. In the latter case by remark 1 and $\langle\langle \mathcal{C}'_{\eta}(t, e), \eta \rangle\rangle = (\mathcal{C}'_{\langle\eta\rangle}(t, e), \langle\eta\rangle)$, $s \Rightarrow s^* \xrightarrow{\langle\langle \mathcal{C}'_{\eta}(t, e), \eta \rangle\rangle} g_{\langle\eta\rangle}(s^*, e)$. Moreover, $\mathcal{I}(s^*)$ and $h_{\langle\eta\rangle}(s^*, e)$ together imply $\mathcal{I}(g_{\langle\eta\rangle}(s^*, e))$. So by definition of \mathcal{R} , $s^* \mathcal{R} t$ and $g_{\langle\eta\rangle}(s^*, e) \mathcal{R} g'_{\eta}(t, e)$.

Concluding, \mathcal{R} is a semi-branching computed network bisimulation.